

LIMINAL SPACES BETWEEN OXFORD AND COLOGNE:
JOHN DYMSDALE'S *QUAESTIONES SUPER METAPHYSICAM*
ON PRIME AND PROXIMATE MATTER

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Abstract: The paper investigates theories of prime and proximate matter in the work of John Dymdale, a thirteenth-century Master of Arts at Oxford. In his *Quaestiones super Metaphysicam*, Dymdale addresses three main problems: (1) whether there exists in matter a kind of diminished form (*forma diminuta*) that subsequently becomes the substantial form of a thing; (2) whether prime matter is numerically one in all material entities; and (3) whether proximate matter adds some real feature to prime matter. The study further examines the textual relationship between John Dymdale and John Picard of Lichtenberg, a German Dominican theologian. Through a synoptic comparison of their works, it demonstrates that Picard borrowed extensively – and often verbatim – from Dymdale's *Quaestiones*. This finding challenges the perceived isolation of German medieval philosophy by revealing a significant Oxonian influence on the Dominican *Studium generale* in Cologne. The paper concludes by presenting a new critical edition of three of Dymdale's *Quaestiones*.

Keywords: John Dymdale; *Quaestiones super Metaphysicam*; prime matter; proximate matter; *forma diminuta*; John Picard of Lichtenberg; liminal spaces.

1. Introduction

What is the value, for medieval studies, of investigating medieval texts written by obscure authors, whose originality of thought and historical relevance are highly debatable? In particular, what is the value of producing modern editions of such texts, and tracing textual parallels to other texts by perhaps equally obscure authors? John Dymdale, admittedly, was an obscure thirteenth-century master of arts in Oxford with no known connection to any school or religious community. As Charles J. Ermatinger and Linus J. Thro observe in the introduction to their critical edition of Dymdale's *Quaestiones* on Aristotle's *Metaphysica* X and XII, the odds against the publication of a late-twentieth century critical edition of such an obscure author are prodigious.¹ In this case, the odds

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were overcome ultimately for one reason: the 1639 Lyons edition of John Duns Scotus's work mistakenly misidentified Dymdsdale's *Quaestiones* as the missing continuation of John Duns Scotus's *Quaestiones subtilissimae* on Aristotle's *Metaphysica* I–IX.² Ermatinger and Thro took this mistaken attribution as a compelling reason to undertake an edition of Dymdsdale's text.³

Notably, some years before the aforementioned edition, Ermatinger identified a strong textual connection between John Dymdsdale's *Quaestiones super Metaphysicam* and the 38 *Quaestiones* attributed to the German Dominican theologian John Picard of Lichtenberg. Ermatinger claimed that Picard's *Quaestiones* 12–14 are condensed versions of Dymdsdale's commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysica* VII and VIII.⁴ On this occasion, Ermatinger did not publish an edition of Dymdsdale's and Picard's questions. Consequently, this textual discovery remained largely unknown and was overlooked by contemporary scholarship.

Despite editorial skepticism, I contend that close analysis even of obscure medieval authors, and the textual connections between them, is historically valuable – for reasons beyond just its intrinsic interest. In particular, examining Dymdsdale's and Picard's respective *Quaestiones* 12–14, and their relation, is interesting for philosophical and historical reasons. I begin this study (section 2) with an overview of John Dymdsdale's biography and an examination of the current state of research on his works. Then (section 3), I present a systematic analysis of the philosophical content of Dymdsdale's questions, along with a synoptic comparison of the textual parallels between Dymdsdale's and Picard's respective *Quaestiones*. My aim in this section is (i) to clarify Dymdsdale's theory of prime and proximate matter, and articulate its philosophical motivations, and (ii) to show how extensively Picard borrowed from Dymdsdale, which in turn testifies to a significant Oxonian influence within the cultural *milieu* of Cologne.⁵

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1 ERMATINGER, THRO 1992, 71.

2 ERMATINGER 1979.

3 ERMATINGER, THRO 1992, 71–74.

4 ERMATINGER 1988.

5 My project here proceeds in the same direction as that indicated by Fiorella Retucci's studies, see *infra*, n. 50. Furthermore, see THRO 1988, esp. 96, which suggests that research into textual correspondence is necessary in order to “reveal more fully the thought and

Finally, in the Appendix, I include a new edition of the three John Dymdsdale's *quaestiones*⁶ under consideration, so that one can also enjoy these texts in their entirety.⁷

Besides the inherent philosophical interest of Dymdsdale's positions, the textual parallels with Picard's *Quaestiones* motivate a novel perspective on the intellectual life of the Dominican *Studium generale*: German medieval philosophy was not as isolated and exceptional as it may appear when considering only the Neoplatonic legacy of Albert the Great, Dietrich of Freiberg, Ulrich of Strasbourg, and Berthold of Moosburg.⁸ Inasmuch as they foster this new historiographical awareness, authors and works such as John Dymdsdale and his *Quaestiones super Metaphysicam* are akin to liminal spaces in the history of medieval philosophy: just like vacant hallways or stairways – eerie and shadowy in themselves yet significant in relation to what surrounds them – they serve as crucial points of connection between different cultural centers. Recognizing this fact is essential for understanding the development of philosophical discourse within its historical framework and to reevaluate the significance of texts written by unknown authors.

2. John Dymdsdale and the *Quaestiones super Metaphysicam*

Biographical information about John Dymdsdale is meager.⁹ His name is attested in 24 different versions – to be distinguished from John Titlesdale O. Carm. (d. c. 1354).¹⁰ Here is what we know for certain: he was an English master of arts

stature of John Dymdsdale – and possibly his enrichment of the work of others.”

6 See *infra*, Appendix, 171.

7 The edition of John Picard's first 19 *Quaestiones* was part of a PhD project completed in Cologne at the Thomas-Institut; see LASORELLA 2025(1). They are now published inside the *Corpus Philosophorum Teutonicorum Medii Aevi* series; see JOHANNES PICARDI VON LICHTENBERG 2025.

8 STURLESE 1981; STURLESE 1984, 460–461; STURLESE 1990, esp. 426; STURLESE 1993, 388; and STURLESE 1996.

9 Information on his life, manuscripts and editions can be found in EMDEN 1959, 1926–1927; GLORIEUX 1971, 239–240; THRO 1988, 93–120; AGUINAGALDE 1990; LOHR 2013, 339–340; SHARPE 2001, 236–237; SCHÖNBERGER, QUERO SÁNCHEZ, BERGES, JIANG 2011, 2595. A more recent comprehensive study on John Dymdsdale biographical data and a comparison between his doctrine and all the other English master of arts of his time can be found instead in DONATI 2002, DONATI 2014, DONATI 2017, esp. 737–738 and 761–765.

10 EMDEN 1959, 1926.

active in Oxford during the late thirteenth century. Between 1284 and 1285, he became a fellow of Merton College, and subsequently assumed the role of sub-warden there in 1286.¹¹ His death is attested around 1289.¹² His works consist mainly of a series of questions on Aristotle's books, including the *Quaestiones super Metaphysicam*, *Quaestiones super Libros De anima* and *Quaestiones super Ethicam*.¹³

Interestingly, Dymdale's *Quaestiones super Metaphysicam* represent one of the few examples of English master of arts' disputations on Aristotle's *Metaphysica* that have survived from that period.¹⁴ They are preserved in two manuscript witnesses: Durham, Cathedral Library, C IV.20, ff. 1ra–196va (= D) and Montpellier, Bibliothèque interuniversitaire, H 293, ff. 84ra–131ra (= M).¹⁵ Confirming the ascription of these disputed questions to John of Dymdale is the

11 THRO 1988, 95.

12 On this point, Sharpe and Donati avoid a precise dating for Dymdale's death and tend towards a more general claim, stating that he died at some point after 1286. See SHARPE 2001, 237 and DONATI 2014, 143.

13 The critical edition of John of Dymdale's *Quaestiones super Metaphysicam* is not completely published but some part of them were edited in THRO, ERMATINGER 1992; THRO, ERMATINGER 1993 and THRO 1998. Only the *proemium* and the questions on the third book of Aristotle's *De anima* written by John of Dymdale are critically edited in their entirety, see AGUINAGALDE 1990, esp. 183–269 and CHRISTENSEN 2017. Moreover, one of Dymdale's questions on the second book concerning the plurality of the forms can be found in THRO 1988, esp. 100–120. The critical edition of John Dymdale's questions on Aristotle's *Ethica Nichomachea* is an ongoing project held by Prof. Taki Suto at the University of Tokyo. To date, the questions on the fifth and tenth books have been published: SUTO 2017; SUTO 2019 and SUTO 2024. See also SUTO 2025. Furthermore, a series of questions on Aristotle's *De animalibus* were ascribed to John Dymdale, but they actually belong to Albert the Great, see LOHR 2013, 340; SHARPE 2001, 237.

14 THRO, ERMATINGER 1992, 72. In recent years, Donati published a list of masters of arts who were active in England during the thirteenth century, along with an overview of their respective works. The list compiled by Donati includes four *Quaestiones super Metaphysicam* written in this period by known English authors: Geoffrey of Aspall, Richard of Clive, John Dymdale and William of Bonkes. Additionally, the list features an English *Sententia super Metaphysicam* ascribed to Adam of Buckfield and six anonymous sets of questions on Aristotle's *Metaphysica* stemming from the same intellectual context. See DONATI 2014, 139–140 and DONATI 2017, 734–740.

15 A description of both the manuscripts can be found in THRO, ERMATINGER 1988, 75–77. Durham manuscript is entirely digitalized and available online on the following website: <https://iiif.biblissima.fr/collections/manifest/e4355a227657cb78730d3e9e29540369687cff53> (accessed 21 February 2026). Also Montpellier codex is completely available online to readers on the following website: https://ged.scdi-montpellier.fr/florabium45/jsp/nodoc.jsp?NODOC=2013_DOC_MON1_MBUM_37 (accessed 21 February 2026).

Durham manuscript at the bottom margin of f. 258r: “Expliciunt questiones xii. librorum Metaphysice et similiter iiii. librorum Ethicorum disputate a Magistro Iohanne de Dicensale anno domini M^oC^oC^o octogesimo tertio.” This text also allows to date Dymdsdale’s *Quaestiones super Metaphysicam* to around 1283, as Alfred Emden and Thro claim.¹⁶ However, Silvia Donati expresses skepticism regarding this precise dating, since “it is not clear whether this date refers to Dinsdale’s questions on both the *Metaphysics* and the *Ethics* or only to the questions on the *Ethics*.” For this reason, she dates this work more generally to the early 1280s.¹⁷

The text transmitted by these two manuscripts, in its most complete survived version, consists of 315 questions. However, only the Durham manuscript transmits this number of questions. The Montpellier codex lacks the initial section of the work, spanning from the prologue to the eleventh question of Book VII. Additionally, throughout the entirety of the text present in Montpellier codex, there are numerous instances where entire columns or pages are left entirely blank.¹⁸ However, notwithstanding these textual *lacunae*, Ermatinger and Thro, in their edition of the questions on Aristotle’s Books X and XII, indicate that the Montpellier manuscript is the most reliable account of Dymdsdale’s work.¹⁹

Moreover, the editors of Dymdsdale’s questions also emphasize the “austere format” of the text, whose “succinct wording and tightly controlled pattern” are proper to the written questions.²⁰ Dymdsdale methodically follows the classic *utrum*-format. He initially presents a series of objections (*argumenta*) and counter-objections (*sed contra*), which are respectively arguments that oppose and support his proposed solution. Thereafter, he offers his own opinion on the

16 See EMDEN 1959, 1926 and THRO 1998, 72.

17 DONATI 2014, 143, esp. n. 26.

18 This is precisely the case of f. 107v. Here, both columns are largely blank, resulting in the omission of textual passages pertaining to two of the questions at issue in this study. These omissions actually include the concluding section of the question *Utrum una sit materia omnium numero ut materia prima* and the introductory part of the following question *Utrum materia proxima aliquid reale addat super materiam primam*.

19 THRO, ERMATINGER 1992, 75: “On ff. 84ra–131ra, anonymous but matching his ascribed questions in *D*, are Dymdsdale’s questions on *Metaphysics* VII–X, XII (our *M*, apparently the more reliable of the two manuscript copies) beginning in question 11 on Book VII [...]”

20 THRO, ERMATINGER 1992, 72–73.

matter (*determinatio*) and the responses (*responsiones*) to the initial *argumenta*, in order to definitively solve the problem and refute the objections. As the two editors assert, this clear and effective structure, along with their concision, aligns Dymdsdale's questions more with the writing style of a handbook than with the longer, more complex composition typically associated with the oral nature of disputed questions.²¹

Dymdsdale's questions have rarely attracted scholars' attention. In 1975, Ermatinger identified the Montpellier manuscript as an anonymous witness of the text that had previously been printed as the missing questions on Aristotle's *Metaphysica* X and XII in John Duns Scotus's *Quaestiones subtilissimae* in the Wadding-Vivès edition.²² At the beginning of his research, Ermatinger argued for the inauthenticity of that attribution to Scotus and postulated that the author of the text could have been a Paris master of arts who lived in the early thirteenth century.²³ However, after he identified an additional copy of the text – namely, the Durham manuscript – Ermatinger himself reformulated his initial hypothesis, ascribing this work to John Dymdsdale.²⁴ In 1992, Ermatinger and Thro finally established the editorial project of the *Quaestiones super Metaphysicam*, publishing the commentary on *Metaphysica* X and XII. In the introduction to that edition, Ermatinger and Thro demonstrated the errors committed by the Wadding-Vivès edition and highlighted several differences between Scotus and Dymdsdale's works.²⁵ Following this publication, further editions of the questions on Aristotle's *Metaphysica* I, II and III were published by Thro in 1998.²⁶

21 THRO, ERMATINGER 1992, 72–73.

22 See IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS 1893, 621–622. In the preface to the questions on Aristotle's *Metaphysica* X and XII, this edition makes reference to the existence of two copies of the text, from which this edition is supposed to stem, namely a manuscript and an early printed edition, presumed to be a Venetian edition printed in 1505. Unfortunately, as stated in the prolegomena of this edition, the existence of these copies is unknown today. Furthermore, no other information are provided about this topic by the modern edition of Scotus' *Quaestiones super Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis*; see ANDREWS, ETZKORN, GÁL, GREEN, KELLY, MARCIL, NOONE, WOOD 1997, XXII. Here, the editors simply quote Ermatinger and Thro's edition of Dymdsdale's *Quaestiones*.

23 ERMATINGER 1975. At that time, Ermatinger was convinced that the supposed author of these questions should have written them before John of Jandun's *Quaestiones super Metaphysicam*, given that this latter text appears to report similar questions.

24 ERMATINGER 1979.

25 THRO, ERMATINGER 1992, 73–75.

26 THRO 1998.

More recently, Silvia Donati found that Dymdsdale was deeply familiar with Thomas' commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysica* and also with the later tradition of Parisian commentaries, among which she has emphasized the dependence of Dymdsdale's text on Peter of Auvergne's *Quaestiones super Metaphysicam*.²⁷

3. A Case of Textual Borrowings: John Dymdsdale and John Picard of Lichtenberg

According to Ermatinger, John Picard's *Quaestiones* 12–14 constituted an abbreviated version of three of John Dymdsdale's original questions. Ermatinger's thesis is fully convincing for at least two main reasons. First, a synoptic comparison of the texts reveals a remarkable degree of textual similarity, demonstrating that the questions are nearly identical.²⁸ Second, Dymdsdale composed his questions on Aristotle's *Metaphysica* in Oxford two decades before Picard's debates in Cologne, leading to the clear conclusion that Picard read and reproduced Dymdsdale's work verbatim.

Furthermore, these three questions constitute a peculiar case within Picard's *Quaestiones*. As they are collected in the manuscripts Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. Lat. 859, ff. 151ra–182vb (= V) and Erfurt, Universitätsbibliothek, CA 2° 321, ff. 99rb–108vb (= E), Picard's *Quaestiones* generally lacks any thematic order, and most of the questions seem to be sequenced randomly. However, Dymdsdale's questions address the same kind of topic and occur in a consecutive order within Picard's *Quaestiones*, showing a coherent thematic core that does not align with its general frame. All of them deal with the concepts of prime and proximate matter: *Utrum in materia sit aliqua forma diminuta, quae fiat forma, supposito quod non sit principium activum* (question 12 = V, 161rb–va); *Utrum materia prima sit una omnium* (question 13 = V, 161va–vb); *Utrum materia proxima aliquid reale addat super materiam primam* (question 14 = V, 161vb–162ra).²⁹ It is also interesting that this set of questions represents a doctri-

27 DONATI 2014, 143–144. For a more recent publication on Dymdsdale, see also BARTOCCI 2021.

28 See LASORELLA 2025(2), XXV–XXVI and LASORELLA 2026.

29 In addition to those pertaining to prime matter, the only series of Picard's questions that display a thematic coherence in their consecutive order within the Vatican codex are the three brief questions regarding the agent intellect: *Utrum sit maior unio per intellectum vel voluntatem* (question 28 (1) = V, 177ra–rb); *Item quaeritur, utrum laus patriae sit magis voluntatis quam intellectus* (question 28 (2) = V, 177rb); *Item utrum intellectus agens sit aliquid*

nal follow-up and enhancement to a longer and more articulated question that precedes them in the Vatican codex: *Utrum in materia generabilium et corruptibilium sit aliqua inchoatio* (question 11 = V, 160ra–161rb).

Moreover, the formal structure of Picard's *Quaestiones* generally does not follow a clear *utrum*-format like that found in John Dymdale's *Quaestiones super Metaphysicam*. In the majority of cases, the introductory section of a *quaestio* features either an explanation of the philosophical terminology employed³⁰ or a detailed doxographical account³¹ of the subject matter under discussion, or both.³² After the introduction, Picard typically provides the solution to the

animae (question 28 (3) = V, 177rb–va; question 5 = E, 101ra–rb); *Utrum intellectus agens habeat operationem circa quiditatem* (question 28 (4) = V, 177va). The index of Picard's *Quaestiones* from the Vatican manuscript and its comparison with that from the Erfurt codex, is provided in the appendix section of LASORELLA 2023, 108–110.

- 30 See for instance the question: *Utrum Deus potuerit sumere humanam naturam sine supposito* (question 3 = JOHANNES PICARDI VON LICHTENBERG 2025, 19, ll. 4–5): “Dicenda sunt hic duo. Primo, quod differunt, scilicet suppositum et essentia; secundo, quod unum praeter alterum sumi potest.”
- 31 See for example the questions: *Utrum theologia sit scientia* (question 1 = JOHANNES PICARDI VON LICHTENBERG 2025, 3, ll. 3–4): “Circa istam quaestionem duo in genere sunt consideranda. Primo, quid secundum aliquos sit dicendum. Secundo, quid secundum veritatem sit tenendum [...]”; *Utrum in transsubstantiatione sic facta conversio fuisset, quod materia in materiam et forma panis in formam Christi, si aliquis apostolorum in triduo celebrasset* (question 4 = JOHANNES PICARDI VON LICHTENBERG 2025, 25, l. 5): “Hic sunt duo videnda. Primo, quid alii ponant; secundo, quid mihi videatur”; *Utrum in materia generabilium et corruptibilium sit aliqua inchoatio* (question 11 = JOHANNES PICARDI VON LICHTENBERG 2025, 97, ll. 4–8): “Dicenda sunt hic quattuor. Primo ponam aliquorum opiniones cum ipsarum reprobatione. Secundo meam cum eius probatione. Tertio declarabo eam cum quadam imaginatione. Quarto tanguntur argumenta cum ipsorum solutione.”
- 32 See for example questions: *Utrum lux sit qualitas realis vel intentionalis* (question 5 = JOHANNES PICARDI VON LICHTENBERG 2025, 30, ll. 3–6): “Circa hanc quaestionem tria oportet videre. Primo declarabo quaestionem. Secundo quaedam narratim notificabo. Tertio tangam multiplicem opinionem ipsam reprobando.” *Utrum species intentionales recipiant numerum ab obiecto vel subiecto*. (question 6 = JOHANNES PICARDI VON LICHTENBERG 2025, 46, ll. 4–7): “Ad huius quaestionis intelligentiam tria sunt advertenda. Primo dabo quaestionis intellectum. Secundo ponam opiniones aliorum. Tertio concludam meam intentionem”; *Utrum Deus sit subiectum in theologia* (question 10 = JOHANNES PICARDI VON LICHTENBERG 2025, 86, ll. 3–11): “Dicenda sunt hic septem. Primo, quomodo differt subiectum a materia. Secundo, quam habitudinem habet scientia ad subiectum. Tertio, quomodo diversi diversimode posuerunt subiectum. Quarto ostenditur, quod Deus est subiectum in hac scientia et nihil aliud. Quinto ostenditur, quod Deus non est subiectum sub ratione universali, qua Deus. Sexto, sub qua ratione Deus subiectum sit. Septimo ostendetur, quod istud est de mente Thomae”; *Utrum theologia sit scientia practica vel speculativa* (question 15 = JOHANNES PICARDI VON LICHTENBERG 2025, 118, ll. 3–5): “Ad intellectum huius quaestionis videnda sunt duo. Primo, unde practicum et speculativum sit accipiendum. Secundo, quid de opinionibus

quaestio, which can be either his own opinion or the opinion which he holds to be the truest one.³³ Afterwards, Picard lists the *argumenta* and the *responsiones ad argumenta* all together at the end of every question, with each *argumentum* always preceded by expressions like *ad primum*, *ad secundum*, *ad tertium*, etc. and each *responsio* by the term *dicendum*.³⁴ However, in contrast to all the other cases, questions 12–14 are the only example in which Picard does not adhere to his typical structure. Instead, he maintains the classical format as it is originally found in Dymdsdale’s *Quaestiones super Metaphysicam*, thus clearly showing that they are textual borrowings.

These two aspects further demonstrate that this set of questions is wholly distinct from the rest of Picard’s text and provide definitive proof that Picard is not the original author of them.

4. John Dymdsdale on Proximate and Prime Matter

In this section, I analyze John Dymdsdale’s theory of prime and proximate matter, which he articulates in his *Quaestiones*. To show the textual correspondences

quorundam sit sentiendum”; *Utrum dimensiones vel alique dispositiones accidentales precedant formam substantialem in materia* (question 19 = JOHANNES PICARDI VON LICHTENBERG 2025, 165, ll. 7–8): “Circa istam igitur quaestionem duo videnda sunt. Primo explicabitur quaestio, secundo narrabitur multiplex opinio.”

33 For this latter case see for example question: *Utrum dimensiones vel alique dispositiones accidentales precedant formam substantialem in materia* (question 19 = JOHANNES PICARDI VON LICHTENBERG 2025, 175, ll. 314–316): “[...] istae duae ultimae positiones [the fifth and sixth positions that are listed in the question] videntur magis verisimiles, licet sint contrariae, ideo respondendum est ad aliquas rationes factas contra eas.”

34 A case of this sort can be exemplified by *Utrum caritas, qua diligimus Deum, sit aliquod creatum in anima* (question 17 = JOHANNES PICARDI VON LICHTENBERG 2025, 150, ll. 199–213): “[...] Ad secundum. Augustinus: “Sicut anima est vita corporis, ita Deus est vita animae”; sed anima vivificat formaliter; ergo et Deus sive Spiritus sanctus. Dicendum, quod corpus per animam vivit, non in anima proprie loquendo; sed “nos in Deo vivimus, movemur et sumus”, ut dicit Augustinus. Et ideo dicendum, quod Deus est aliter vita animae quam anima corporis, quia effective secundum se, sed formaliter per gratiam. Ad tertium. Augustinus in XV *De Trinitate* dicit, quod hoc: “Deus caritas est” non est dictum per causam, sicut dicimus “Deus patientia mea vel spes mea”, sed absolute et per essentiam. Unde infra idem subiungit, quod ita dictum est “Deus caritas est, sicut dictum est de Spiritu sancto”. Dicendum est, quod intentio Augustini est, quod, quia animae virtutes, scilicet patientia, spes et huiusmodi, aliquid imperfectionis in habente important, quod ideo non sunt essentialiter in Deo, sed causaliter, caritas autem non. Et ideo non est intentio Augustini, quod eadem numero caritas sit Spiritus sanctus et caritas creata, sed quod nostra non solum causaliter, sed exemplariter est ab illa [...].”

between Dymdale's and Picard's works, I provide a series of synoptic tables. I shall particularly focus on instances where Picard's text diverges from Dymdale's; this will clarify the nature and significance of Picard's revisions of the original material, while still maintaining the focus on Dymdale's positions.

3.1 *Utrum in materia sit aliqua forma diminuta sive inchoatio formae, quae postea fiat forma rei, etsi non sit aliquod principium activum*

The first question deals with the problem of whether exists in matter a kind of diminished form, which subsequently becomes the substantial form of a thing. The problem of the *forma diminuta* or *inchoatio formae*³⁵ has its roots in Aristotelian metaphysics, especially in the concept of substance and its changes in the process of generation and corruption. In the late Middle Ages,³⁶ the philosophical challenge of explaining the substantial change was to describe how a form could make way for another within the same matter, when Aristotelian thought considered both matter and forms to be static components of substance. According to Aristotle, matter is pure indeterminacy and potentiality, whereas substantial forms are unchanging and always identical to themselves. It is therefore problematic to explain how the complex and dynamic process of generation and corruption can arise from such wholly static and unchanging elements. To overcome this problem, various medieval scholars posited the existence of an imperfect, diminished version of the substantial form, which can dwell in potency within matter and reach its completion through actuality at the end of the process of generation. In his questions on Aristotle's *Metaphysica* VII, Dymdale treats this topic and offers a general account of the problem:

35 On the correspondence between the concepts of *forma diminuta* and *inchoatio formae* see DONATI 2002, 218–230, esp. 223.

36 A milestone study on the concept of *inchoatio formae* is NARDI 1960. For more recent studies on this topic, see WIPPEL 1981, 293–314; LIZZINI 2013; GOSSIAUX 2021; BRAY 2024.

IOHANNES DE TYTYNGSALE, <i>Quaestiones super Metaphysicam VII</i>; in Durham, Cathedral Library, C IV.20, f. 127va–b and Montpellier, Bibliothèque interuniversitaire, H 293, f. 92rb–va:	JOHANNES PICARDI VON LICHTENBERG 2025, <i>Quaestiones I–XIX</i>, 110, l. 43–111, l. 63:
<i>Ad quaestionem dicendum, quod, sicut dicit Commentator in XI huius, circa istam quaestionem duae fuerunt opiniones extremae.</i> <i>Una ponit formam totaliter et semper praefuisse in materia, et haec ponit latitationem formarum et fuit positio Anaxagorae.</i> <i>Alia ponit formam sive rem totaliter, et quantum ad formam et quantum ad materiam, de novo esse, et si loquamur de prima rerum productione, haec est opinio Christianorum.</i> <i>Sed inter istas duas opiniones extremas sunt tres mediae, quae nec ponunt rem totaliter praefuisse nec de novo esse. Quarum una ponit formam causari in materia praeeistente ab aliqua intelligentia separata, et haec est opinio Avicennae.</i> <i>Alia ponit formam causari in materia ab aliqua forma separata eiusdem speciei, et haec est opinio Platonis.</i> <i>Aristoteles autem viam mediam tenet, nec ponit formam totaliter fieri ab extra nec totaliter ab intra, sed partim ab extra et partim ab intra: ab intra, quia ex potentia materiae, ab extra, quia ab agente extrinseco.</i> <i>Sed circa istam opinionem dupliciter se habent moderni, quia, quod forma educatur de potentia materiae potest esse dupliciter: aut ita quod praesit aliqua forma diminuta in materia aut non.</i> <i>Quod praesit talis forma diminuta, quae postea fiat forma completa, multi</i>	<i>Ad quaestionem dicendum est, sicut dicit Commentator in XI, quod circa istam quaestionem duae fuerunt opiniones extremae.</i> <i>Una ponit formam semper praeesse in materia sicut Anaxagoras.</i> <i>Alia ponit rem et quantum ad materiam et quantum ad formam in materia totaliter esse de novo, et haec est opinio Christianorum.</i> <i>Sed inter has sunt tres mediae, quae neque ponunt rem totaliter praefuisse nec totaliter de novo esse, quarum una ponit formam causari in materia ab intelligentia separata, et haec est opinio Avicennae.</i> <i>Alia ponit causari in materia ab agente separato eiusdem speciei, sicut Plato de ideis.</i> <i>Sed Aristoteles viam mediam, nec ponit formam esse totaliter ab intra, sed partim causari ab intra et partim ab extra, ab intra, quia ex potentia materiae, ab extra, quia ab agente extrinseco.</i> <i>Sed circa hanc opinionem dupliciter se habent moderni, quia, quod forma educatur de potentia materiae, hoc est dupliciter, aut quod praesit forma diminuta in materia aut non.</i> <i>Quod praesit, multi ponunt, ne ponant aliquid fieri ex nihilo.</i>

<i>ponunt, ne ponant formam fieri ex nihilo. Sed quod necesse sit in omni motu et omni generatione aliquid esse, quod non praefuit et quod non fiat ex aliquo, ostendo sic. Sit aliquod generatum ABCD, quaero utrum huius compositi aliquid praefuit aut non.</i>	<i>Quod autem in omni generatione hoc sit necessarium, scilicet aliquid esse, quod non praefuit, et non fiat ex aliquo, ostendo sic. Sit aliquod generatum ABC, sicut supra in praecedenti quaestione in secunda opinione.</i>
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Quoting Averroes' *Commentarium in Metaphysicam Aristotelis*,³⁷ Dymdsdale establishes a general framework for understanding the different theories of generation and the relation between matter and form within this process. According to Averroes's account, there are two 'extreme' positions on this issue. The first is the opinion of Anaxagoras, who assumes that the essence of a form preexists in matter in its complete actuality. This theory, commonly called *latitatio formarum*, was upheld by the ancient philosophers, who did not yet distinguish between the concepts of act and potency. For them, it was inconceivable that something could come into being unless it already existed in actuality; otherwise, things would have arisen from nothingness and generation would have amounted to creation. Hence, according to Anaxagoras, all forms must already exist in actuality, they are just hidden in matter and are made manifest only through the process of generation. Generation does not create a new form *ex nihilo* but discloses what was previously concealed. In contrast to this theory, the second 'extreme' position is attributed to the Christians, who, contrary to Anaxagoras, hold that entities are created completely *ex novo*, both in their matter and in their form.

Between these two radically opposed opinions, Averroes identifies three 'middle' solutions to the problem of generation, which avoid both the eternal preexistence of forms in matter and the creation of entities out of nothing. All these three solutions assume that generation requires a preexisting subject, and thus understand this process as a change, occurring in a substance, that must result in a production of another substance. The first two positions entail that forms are externally and wholly caused in matter, either by a separate intelligence or by a separate agent. These positions correspond, respectively, to the views of Avicenna and Plato; but, according to Averroes, they too are mistaken.

³⁷ ARISTOTELES, AVERROES 1562-1574, vol. VIII, *In Metaphysicam*, XII, 18, f. 304rD-304vL.

The true ‘middle’ view is that of Aristotle,³⁸ who holds that the form comes neither wholly from within nor wholly from without. Rather, since the form arises both from the potency of matter and from the action of an external agent, the form itself is partly caused from within and partly from without. According to Averroes, Aristotle maintains that the external agent produces the whole substance, composed of matter and form, by merely moving and transmuting the potency of the matter into actuality as a form. In other words, the external agent neither adds anything extrinsic to matter nor produces a form through its own form. Instead, its action consists simply in drawing into actuality from matter’s potency the form proper to the agent itself. From this perspective, in the composite substance both matter and form come to be from within; yet the metaphysical transition from the potency of the matter to the actuality of a certain form is allowed by the action of the external agent, which comes from without.

Having explained this, Dymdale adds that Aristotle’s theory of generation was interpreted by his medieval contemporaries in different ways. Some held that drawing the form out of the potency of matter means that the form preexists in matter as a diminished, imperfect version of itself, while others denied this theory. The former group, like Anaxagoras and the ancient philosophers, postulated the existence of such a diminished form in order to avoid the extreme implication of creation *ex nihilo*. However, Dymdale rejects this latter solution and insists that generation must instead involve the production of something that did not previously exist, without thereby implying creation *ex nihilo*.

At this point in the *quaestio*, Picard’s text diverges from Dymdale’s. Dymdale starts providing a detailed refutation of the *forma diminuta* theory, whereas

38 ARISTOTELES, AVERROES 1562-1574, vol. VIII, *In Metaphysicam*, XII, 18, f. 304vH-L: “Tertia autem est opinio Aristotelis et est, quod agens non facit nisi compositum ex materia et forma. Et hoc fit movendo materiam, et transmutando eam, donec exeat de ea illud, quod est de potentia in ea, ad illam formam in actu. [...] Sed agens apud Aristotelem [...] extrahens illud, quod est in potentia ad actum, et quasi congregat inter potentiam et actum, scilicet inter materiam et formam, secundum quod extrahit potentiam ad actum, non destruendo subiectum recipiens potentiam: et tunc efficiuntur in composito duo, scilicet materia et forma. [...] Intentio igitur sermonis Aristotelis quod conveniens a conveniente, aut prope convenientem, non est quod conveniens agit per se et per suam formam, formam sibi convenientis, sed est dicere, quod extrahit formam sibi convenientis ex potentia in actum, et non est agens, quia adducit in illam materiam aliquid extrinsecum. Et sic est in hoc de substantia, sicut in aliis accidentibus. Calidum enim non inducit in corpus calidum calorem extrinsecum, sed facit calidum in potentia esse calidum in actu.”

Picard refrains from developing his argument in full, referring instead to his preceding question (*sicut supra in praecedenti quaestione*). Picard actually split Dymsdale's original refutation, and reproduces this text in the previous question 11 (*Utrum in materia generabilium et corruptibilium sit aliqua inchoatio*). See the following synoptic table:

IOHANNES DE TYTYNGSALE, <i>Quaestiones super Metaphysicam</i> VII; in Durham, Cathedral Library, C IV.20, f. 127vb and Montpellier, Bibliothèque interuniversitaire, H 293, f. 92va:	JOHANNES PICARDI VON LICHTENBERG 2025, <i>Quaestiones I–XIX</i>, 98, ll. 28–42:
Sit aliquod generatum ABCD, quaero utrum huius compositi aliquid praefuit aut non. Si nihil, habeo propositum. Si <i>aliquid</i>, sit illud A, tunc quaero de residuo, utrum istius aliquid praefuit aut non. Si <i>nihil</i>, habeo propositum, quod aliquid est, quod prius non fuit. Si <i>aliquid</i> praefuit, sit illud B, et quaero de residuo, et sic est necessario procedere in <i>infinitum</i>, quod est impossibile, vel oportet devenire ad aliquid, cuius nihil praefuit, et tunc habetur propositum, vel oportet ponere, quod totum generatum praefuit, et tunc est auferre omnem generationem.	Unde est alia opinio, quae dicit, quod est ibi forma non secundum essentiam perfectam, sed secundum partem sui et per generans fit tota; et ratio movens eos est, ne dicant aliquid fieri ex nihilo, quod oporteret, sicut dicunt, si nihil formae praeexisteret; et idem motivum est commune omnibus, qui ponunt inchoationes. Sed nec hoc stare potest. Primo, quia forma substantialis, cum sit indivisibilis secundum Commentatorem V Physicorum, non habet partem et partem. Secundo, quia nec sic evadunt, quod intendunt. Sit enim forma inducenda ABC, quia secundum te est divisibilis. Si ergo huius formae <i>aliquid</i> praeeexistat, sit illud A; ergo cum residui, scilicet BC, <i>nihil</i> praeeexistat, erit eius creatio vel aliquid sine creatione potest induci, cuius nihil praeeexistebat. Si autem et huius, scilicet BC, <i>aliquid</i> praeeexistit, scilicet B, et tunc C totum sive aliquid sui inducitur, alias erit in <i>infinitum</i> ire. Si autem ponas totum praeeexistere C, et tunc erit idem cum prima opinione. Nec oportet aliquid fieri ex nihilo, si nihil eius praeeexistat, sicut infra dicitur.

In his question 11, Picard once again maintains that scholars embrace the doctrine of the *inchoatio formae* as a means of avoiding the conclusion that forms arise out of nothing. Yet, he contends that this metaphysical problem would remain even if one assumes the existence of a diminished form within matter.

To show this, Picard rewords Dymsdale's demonstration, which itself rests on the assumption that any theory concerning the *forma diminuta* must conceive the form present and introduced into matter as divisible into parts or degrees. For instance, if one considers a form ABC to be divisible, then, before this form is fully actualized, something of it must preexist in matter as its diminished version – namely, A. This would mean that nothing of the formal residual BC, which is required to complete the form ABC, would exist prior to this completion. This implies a dilemma: either nothing of this residual preexists, resulting in its actual creation *ex nihilo*, or some part of the residual does preexist. Since this position seeks to avoid creation *ex nihilo*, some portion of the formal residual BC must indeed preexist alongside A – for example, B. However, it can be stated that, also in this case, either nothing of the formal residual C preexists, in which case it is created, or some part of C preexists alongside AB, from which the remaining part of C is derived. If any portion of the formal residual C actually preexisted, then the continuous division of the residual would be *ad infinitum*, which is clearly impossible.

Only two scenarios are possible, therefore: either the formal residual C preexists in its entirety, or there is some part of C that does not preexist, and which must therefore be created *ex nihilo*. If the whole of the formal residual C truly preexisted in matter alongside AB, then the supposedly diminished form present in matter would correspond to the complete and perfect form ABC. However, this contradicts the initial premise of the theory, which maintains that only a diminished version of the complete form should preexist in matter. Thus, by elimination, there must be a part of C that does not preexist in matter alongside AB, and this portion of the form must be created *ex nihilo*.

Hence, if a form is divisible and that part of this divisible form preexists in matter, then some portion of the form does not preexist and must be created *ex nihilo*. In other words, Dymsdale – and, in the same manner, Picard – demonstrate, via a *reductio ad absurdum*, that although the assumption of a preexisting

diminished form in matter aims to resolve the problem of creation *ex nihilo*, its consequences ultimately reproduce the same metaphysical difficulty.

After this confutation, Dymsdale supplements it with several corollary demonstrations and the explanation of his own solution, whereas Picard provides no further clarification. Rather, Picard refers to a subsequent question in his work (*sicut infra dicetur*) – namely, the end of the solution to his question 12 (which has already been mentioned above). There, Picard once again resumes by quoting verbatim from Dymsdale’s original text:

IOHANNES DE TYTYNGSALE, <i>Quaestiones super Metaphysicam</i> VII; in Durham, Cathedral Library, C IV.20, ff. 127vb–128ra and Montpellier, Bibliothèque interuniversitaire, H 293, f. 92va–b:	JOHANNES PICARDI VON LICHTENBERG 2025, <i>Quaestiones I–XIX</i>, 110, l. 57–111, l. 63:
Praeterea omnes istam positionem tenentes ponunt aliquid actu esse post generationem, quod non praefuit in actu completo. Sed tunc quaero de ista completionem et actualitate. Et arguo, quia non praefuit, quia si sic, nihil esset acquisitum per generationem, et ista actualitas nunc est et non praefuit, ergo aliquid est, quod non fit ex aliquo. Dicendum est igitur, quod in omni generatione est aliquid per generationem acquisitum, quod non praefuit nec ex aliquo fit per se. Sed istud non potest esse minus quam indivisibile nec aliud quam terminus generationis. Cum ergo forma sit indivisibilis et finis generationis, istud necessario est forma. [...] <i>Dicendum est igitur, quod in materia non est forma diminuta, quae postea fit forma rei, nec tamen creatur, quia creatio est productio existentis et forma non habet esse per se, sed per compositum, nec fit ex nihilo, sed non fit ex aliquo, scili-</i>	Quod autem in omni generatione hoc sit necessarium, scilicet aliquid esse, quod non praefuit, et non fiat ex aliquo, ostendo sic. Sit aliquod generatum ABC, sicut supra in praecedenti quaestione in secunda opinione. <i>Dicendum est ergo, quod in materia non est forma diminuta nec tamen creatur, quia creatio est productio entis per se et forma non habet esse per se, sed compositum, nec fit ex nihilo, sed</i>

cet ex nihilo vel non ex aliquo fit, quia refert dicere ‘fit ex nihilo’ et ‘ex nihilo fit’, quia in prima affirmatur fieri et secunda negatur. Unde proprie dicendum est, quod forma non fit ex aliquo per se, etsi per accidens fiat, hoc est ex aliquo, quia <i>ex materia</i>. Non tamen ita, quod materia sit pars eius, quia hoc est proprium compositi, cuius est factio per se.	<i>ex materia, non tamen ita, quod materia sit pars eius, quia hoc est proprium compositi.</i>
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In concluding his *solutio*, Dymsdale explains the view of those scholars – with whom he agrees – who sought to resolve the metaphysical issue concerning the generation of forms from matter’s potentiality by rejecting both creation *ex nihilo* and the existence of a diminished form. They maintained that, since creation is defined as the production of an entity in the absolute sense (*productio existentis*), material forms cannot properly be said to be created, for they do not exist in such an absolute sense. Accordingly, only the composite substance exists in absolute sense, whereas matter and material forms exist only as essential components of the substance (*per compositum*). Furthermore, if form cannot be derived from a diminished version of itself, since the process of generation must result in the production of something genuinely new, the generated form must arise from something other than itself. The form must then emerge from matter, not because matter itself is a part of the form – for then, generation would not result in the production of something new –, but because the form is drawn out into actuality from the potency of matter, in such a way that both matter and form are essential components of the same substance. Ultimately, for Dymsdale, what neither existed prior to generation nor is produced *per se* is the form of the generated substance and its actuality; the form and its actuality are the truly new elements of the process of generation (*per generationem acquisitum, quod non praefuit nec ex aliquo fit per se*).

With regard to Picard’s textual borrowing, this first case demonstrates the profound theoretical influence of Dymsdale’s questions on Picard. In fact, Picard employed, reworked, and paraphrased Dymsdale’s text to deepen his discussion on the *inchoatio formae* in question 11 and to refute the existence of a diminished version of the form within matter in question 12.

3.2 Utrum una sit materia omnium numero ut materia prima

In the second question, Dymdsdale considers whether prime matter is numerically one for all material entities. Here too, Picard reproduces Dymdsdale's text word-for-word in his own question 13:

IOHANNES DE TYTYNGSALE, <i>Quaestiones super Metaphysicam</i> VIII; in Durham, Cathedral Library, C IV.20, f. 152rb and Montpellier, Bibliothèque interuniversitaire, H 293, f. 107rb, and Durham, Cathedral Library, C IV.20, ff. 152vb–153ra:	JOHANNES PICARDI VON LICHTENBERG 2025, <i>Quaestiones I–XIX</i>, 112, ll. 2–4 and 114, ll. 49–52:
Nunc quaeritur, utrum una materia prima sit una omnium numero. <i>Et videtur quod sic.</i> Illud, ad quod stat resolutio omnium generabilium, est unum numero; sed materia prima est huiusmodi; ergo etc. Maior patet per Philosophum in II Metaphysicae, ubi dicit, quod status est in omni causa; sed in causa efficiente et finali est devenire ad aliquod unum primum numero; ergo et in causis materialibus. [...] <i>Ad primum argumentum dicendum,</i> quod, cum dicitur, quod illud est unum numero, ad quod stat resolutio, dicendum quod hoc non est verum, immo requiritur ad hoc, non quod illud ad quod stat resolutio sit idem numero, sed quod sit idem, scilicet et unum per indifferentiam et privationem, et quod non sit aliquid prius eo in suo genere. <i>Ad probationem dicendum, quod non est eadem ratio de causis extrinsecis, ut de fine et efficiente, et de materia et forma, quia materia et forma sunt principia intrinseca, et ideo quot sunt principiata, tot sunt formae primae et materiae primae, et sicut non est una forma omnium, sic nec est una materia omnium.</i>	<i>Quaeritur, utrum materia prima sit una omnium.</i> <i>Et videtur, quod sic, quia id, in quo stat resolutio omnium, est unum numero, ut patet per Philosophum II Metaphysicae, quia in causis est status.</i> [...] <i>Ad argumenta. Ad primum dicendum, sicut supra.</i> <i>Ad probationem dicendum, quod non est eadem ratio de fine et efficiente et materia et forma, quia haec sunt principia intrinseca, et ideo quot sunt principiata, tot sunt formae et materiae,</i>

<i>Sed finis et efficiens sunt separata a principiatis, et ideo possibile est devenire ad unum principiatum numero.</i>	<i>sed illa sunt separata a principiatis et in illis devenitur ad unum.</i>
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In the first objection, Dymdale presents an argument in support of the unity of matter for all beings. According to this argument, the process of analysis (*resolutio*)³⁹ carried out by the intellect with respect to all generable and corruptible beings terminates at a cause that is numerically one. Since prime matter is numerically one, it follows that an analysis of such beings must ultimately arrive at prime matter.

This claim is supported by Aristotle's *Metaphysica* II, where an entire section is devoted to showing that an infinite series of causes cannot exist and that the classes of causes are not infinite in number. According to Aristotle, there are, in fact, only four classes of causes: the efficient, material, final, and formal causes. Moreover, in presenting a detailed argument against the possibility of a *regressus ad infinitum* with respect to all four classes of causes, Aristotle maintains that every series of causes must end in a first cause from which all others derive. Consequently, since the classes of causes are four, each series of causes must have its own first cause, that is different for every class of causes under consideration.⁴⁰ Resting on Aristotle's account, Dymdale's objection further argues that because the regress of both final and efficient causes ultimately terminates at a first cause that is numerically one, the regress of material causes must likewise terminate at a first material cause that is numerically one: prime matter.

39 On the definition of *resolutio* and the difference between *resolutio* as a reduction to extrinsic causes (*resolutio secundum rem*) and to intrinsic causes (*resolutio secundum rationem*), see THOMAS DE AQUINO 1992, 162, ll. 350–356 and 162, ll. 362–382; on Aquinas' *via resolutionis*, see also AERTSEN 1988, 252–275; AERTSEN 1996, 73–80; AERTSEN 1998, esp. 182; PORRO 2017 and TE VELDE 2021, 73–105. On Aquinas' definition of intrinsic and extrinsic principles, see also THOMAS DE AQUINO 1976, *De principiis naturae*, 42, ll. 47–52.

40 ARISTOTELES 1957, 994a1–994b31. In this respect, Dymdale's objection seems to establish a connection between Aristotle's reduction of a series of causes to specific classes of first causes and the process of resolution. This parallel is legitimate, since Aquinas himself states that the *resolutio secundum rem* corresponds to the reduction to the first efficient and final causes, whereas the *resolutio secundum rationem* corresponds to the reduction to the first formal and material principles: THOMAS DE AQUINO 1992, 162, ll. 350–356 and 162, ll. 362–382. On this, see also AERTSEN 1988, 256–271. On the difference between extrinsic causes and intrinsic causes and their interconnection with the two *resolutiones*, see also THOMAS DE AQUINO 1992, 153, l. 80–154, l. 205 and the study in PORRO 2017, esp. 498–508.

Dymsdale replies to this argument by stating that the analysis of a series of causes with respect to generable and corruptible beings does not necessarily terminate at a first cause that is numerically one. Concerning the class of the material causes, the analysis must terminate at a first material cause that is one in the sense that this is identical (*idem*) for every cause in the series and precedes all of them within that series. The claim that any analysis must terminate at a first cause that is numerically one actually represents a misinterpretation of Aristotle's text, which only asserts that at the terminus of any series of causes there must be a cause that is first and that is not caused by anything else. Moreover, Dymsdale argues that for a first cause to be one, identical, and prior to all the other causes of a series, it must underlie these causes, while none of their differentiating characteristics pertain to it (*unum per indifferentiam et privationem*). Therefore, according to Dymsdale, the analysis of the material causes of every generable and corruptible entities does lead to prime matter as the first cause. However, this does not imply that prime matter is numerically one; rather, prime matter is identical and one inasmuch as no formal distinctive attribute belonging to the series of material causes of all generable and corruptible entities can be predicated of it. Indeed, if all generable and corruptible beings are each reduced to their respective prime matter, these instances of prime matter are not numerically one, but many, sharing only a unity *per indifferentiam*. In this sense, there is nothing by which one instance of prime matter is distinguished from another.⁴¹ Furthermore, these instances underlie all generable and corruptible entities, insofar as they constitute the ultimate, undefined and potential substrate (*substratum*) of their existence.

Picard's version of Dymsdale's text is considerably shorter. For instance, in the reply to the first objection, instead of addressing the issue directly, Picard merely refers the reader to an unspecified earlier part of the question (*sicut supra*). A similar stance on the potential unity of prime matter appears indeed in the solution of Dymsdale's question. Unlike the preceding synoptic example, however, in this case Picard reproduces Dymsdale's text without introducing any substantial modifications:

41 In his commentary on *Metaphysica* II, Thomas Aquinas actually states that every composite substance comes from the first material principle – that is, from prime matter, as from what is imperfect and exists only in potency. Prime matter is something purely potential that is in between non-being and being existing in actuality: THOMAS DE AQUINO 1971, 87a–88b, esp. 88b.

IOHANNES DE TYTYNGSALE, <i>Quaestiones super Metaphysicam</i> VIII; in Durham, Cathedral Library, C IV.20, f. 152va–b and Montpellier, Bibliothèque-interuniversitaire, H 293, f. 107rb–va:	JOHANNES PICARDI VON LICHTENBERG 2025, <i>Quaestiones I–XIX</i>, 113, ll. 20–42:
<i>Dicendum est, quod, sicut aliquid est ens, sic est unum, et sic talis est quaerenda unitas in unoquoque qualis est entitas; sed materia secundum se et de se est ens in potentia;</i> <i>in ipsa ergo solum est quaerenda unitas in potentia. Cum ergo quaeritur, utrum una sit materia prima omnium generabilium et corruptibilium, dicendum, quod est loqui de materia prima dupliciter: aut secundum quod est sub forma aut circumscribendo omnem formam.</i> <i>Si secundum quod est sub forma, sic planum est, quod non est una numero omnium, quia impossibile est aliquid unum et idem esse in diversis locis et moveri diversis motibus. Sed ubi est compositum, ibi est materia per accidens, et si moveatur compositum, movetur materia per accidens. Nunc autem ignis et aqua possunt esse in diversis locis et moveri motibus contrariis. Ergo impossibile est, quod una materia numero sit in eis.</i> <i>Praeterea nullus diceret, quod materia proxima omnium est una numero; sed materia proxima et materia prima non sunt separata realiter; ergo etc.</i> <i>Si loquamur de materia prima circumscribendo omnem formam substantialem et accidentalem, particularem et universalem, sic dico adhuc, quod materia prima non est una numero omnium, una tamen est secundum rationem, quia materia negatione ostenditur sicut</i>	<i>Dicendum, quod, sicut aliquid est ens, ita est unum, et talis est quaerenda in unoquoque unitas, qualis etiam ei debetur entitas. Sed materia de se est ens in potentia.</i> <i>In ipsa ergo solum quaerenda est unitas in potentia.</i> <i>Dicendum ergo, quod est loqui de materia prima dupliciter. Aut secundum quod est sub forma aut circumscribendo omnem formam.</i> <i>Si primo modo, sic non est una numero, quia impossibile est unum et idem esse sub diversis formis et moveri diversis motibus, scilicet contrariis. Sed ubi est compositum, ibi est et materia per accidens, et sic moto composito movetur materia per accidens.</i> <i>Nunc autem ignis et terra etc.</i> <i>Praeterea materia proxima non est una numero omnium, illa autem non est realiter separata a prima materia.</i> <i>Si loquamur secundo modo de materia,</i> <i>sic nec adhuc est una numero omnibus, una tamen secundum rationem, quia materia ostenditur negatione sicut et genus per Aristotelem in X Metaphysicae. Sed</i>

<i>et genus per Philosophum in X. Sed sicut qui circumscribit a genere omnem differentiam, nullam in genere percipit distinctionem (sed hoc non obstante genus realiter est diversum),</i> <i>sic qui apprehendit materiam per privationem omnium formarum, nullam multitudinem circa ipsam apprehendit, sed nec aliquam unitatem realem propter hoc sibi attribuit. Sed sic solum est una apud rationem, quia circumscriptio formarum non est extra intellectum, realiter tamen ipsa materia est multa, quia unitas in ratione non concludit unitatem realem in re.</i> <i>Unde circa istam quaestionem sunt diversae opiniones. Si tamen interius respicitur, non contrariantur. Ponentes enim materiam primam esse unam omnium ponunt ipsam esse unam per indifferentiam et privationem formarum, et ponentes ipsam non esse unam ponunt ipsam non esse unam in re sicut nec formam primam.</i> <i>Unde unitas rationis non repugnat pluralitati in re.</i>	<i>sicut qui circumscribit a genere omnem differentiam, nullam in genere percipit distinctionem,</i> <i>sic qui apprehendit materiam per privationem omnium formarum, nullam multitudinem circa ipsam apprehendit nec aliquam unitatem realem. Sic enim una est apud rationem, quia circumscriptio formarum a materia non est extra intellectum in re, cum ipsa materia sit multa. Unitas enim in ratione non ponit unitatem in re.</i> <i>Sic enim intelligendo quaestionem opiniones, licet videantur diversae, in idem referentur. Ponentes enim unam materiam in omnibus ponunt ipsam esse unam per privationem et indifferentiam formarum.</i> <i>Ponentes ipsam non esse unam ponunt eam non esse unam in re sicut nec formam.</i> <i>Unde unitas rationis non repugnat pluralitati in re.</i>
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As in the latter passage, Dymdsdale restates in his main *solutio* that the potential unity of prime matter can be achieved only by removing any distinctive formal characteristic that pertains to matter insofar as it exists in a substance (*per privationem et indifferentiam formarum*).

On this occasion, however, Dymdsdale grounds his *solutio* on the Aristotelian claim that the notions ‘one’ and ‘being’ are metaphysically inseparable and follow upon one another.⁴² This view implies that anything that is a being (*ens*)

⁴² This metaphysical statement is expressed by Aristotle in ARISTOTELES 1957, 1003b24–35. See also HAMESSE 1974, 122, l. 38. In this passage, Aristotle asserts that ‘one’ and ‘being’ are essentially intertwined, as they are fundamentally identical in nature but distinct in regard to their specific concepts. This implies that they define the same kind of entities, albeit in a different manner. In his commentary on Aristotle’s *Metaphysica*, Thomas Aquinas explains that this is possible since the one, which is convertible with the being, does not add any real property to the nature of being; rather, it merely adds a conceptual prop-

must also be one (*unum*). Therefore, in investigating the unity of a given entity, one must take its being into account. Accordingly, the unity of matter can only be properly considered by first examining its being. Dymdsdale then argues that matter, considered in itself – namely, prime matter – is a being in potency; consequently, its unity must be understood as a unity in potency. Now, prime matter can be considered in two distinct ways: insofar as it exists under form; second, insofar as it is deprived of any form.

When understood insofar as it exists under some form, prime matter cannot be understood as numerically one, since nothing subjected to different forms and moved by contrary motions can be numerically one. I illustrate this with an example Dymdsdale does not himself provide: if the matter underlying two surfaces, one painted black and the other white, were numerically one, then the two surfaces would be one in actuality, and this single surface would be simultaneously qualified by contrary colors. This is clearly impossible: it contravenes the principle of noncontradiction. In a similar vein, Dymdsdale argues that since water and fire can occupy two distinct locations and be subject to opposite motions at the same time, these two elements cannot be composed of a matter that is numerically one.

When understood as devoid of any form, however, prime matter can indeed be considered one, albeit only according to reason (*secundum rationem*). This is because, as Aristotle states in *Metaphysica* X,⁴³ matter, like genus, can be understood only by negation. That is, a genus is grasped in itself only after the removal of all specific differences. Similarly, prime matter can be apprehended in its undefined and common being only by an intellectual act that removes from a given entity all the formal attributes (*circumscriptio formarum*) that distinguish it from the others.⁴⁴

erty, that is, a negation or a privation. The concept of the one actually adds to the nature of being the property of indivisibility. For this reason, the one and being are identical according to the thing signified by them (*secundum rem*), but different according to the concepts through which they signify that same thing (*secundum rationem*). See THOMAS DE AQUINO 1971, 154a–156b. For an analysis of the influence of this Aristotle's passage on Thomas Aquinas' theory of the transcendentals and understanding of the convertibility of the transcendental concepts of 'one' and 'being' see AERTSEN 1996, 141–146 and 207–210.

43 ARISTOTELES 1957, 1058a23; HAMESSE 1974, 136, l. 35–36. Aquinas also speaks of this topic in THOMAS DE AQUINO 1971, 500b.

44 Cf. ARISTOTELES, AVERROES 1562-1574, vol. VIII, *In Metaphysicam*, XII, 18, ff. 300vK–301rB.

Furthermore, this removal of all forms by the intellect also entails the removal of any kind of actual existence in prime matter, as matter exists in actuality and possesses any real unity only through form.⁴⁵

In other words, once the matter of a given entity is conceived as completely devoid of its own forms, neither multitude nor real unity can be attributed to it. This implies that, although the human mind can grasp the potential being and unity of prime matter through the act of negation, this kind of being and unity is never real and exists solely within the confines of reason. Therefore, according to Dymdale, prime matter can be identical and one for every existing substance only when considered by reason in its pure potentiality. However, this potential unity neither implies nor establishes any actual and formal numerical unity.

In summary, when subject to the actuality of forms, prime matter cannot be considered numerically one for all material substances. Conversely, when grasped in itself through the intellectual act of negation, prime matter can be understood as one, but only in potency. Dymdale infers that both these perspectives ultimately lead to the same conclusion. Since the unity according to reason (*unitas rationis*) is not incompatible with plurality according to reality (*pluralitas in re*), it is not contradictory to affirm that prime matter may be one in reason while numerically many in actually existing things.

As expected, a thorough examination of Dymdale's solution to the question reveals a striking similarity in content to the response given to the first objection: both texts argue for the potential unity and identity of prime matter, achievable only through the intellectual act of negation. This strong likeness between the two passages confirms the thesis that the unspecified part of the question (*sicut supra*) to which Picard was referring in his response to the first objection corresponds precisely to the solution of the question. More broadly, the comparison between Dymdale and Picard's versions shows, once again, that Picard's theory of matter is indebted to Dymdale.

45 Cf. ARISTOTELES 1957, 1039a7 and 1041b8; HAMESSE 1974, 130, ll. 12–14, and also THOMAS DE AQUINO 1971, 381a and 397b.

3.3 Utrum materia proxima aliquid reale addat super materiam primam

The third question treats whether proximate matter (*materia proxima*) adds some real feature to prime matter (*materia prima*). The distinction between proximate and prime matter originates from Aristotle's *Metaphysica* VIII, and during the Middle Ages, this distinction was a subject of debate by numerous authors, including Averroes, Vincent of Beauvais, Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas.⁴⁶ Prime matter is completely undefined, lacks any form of its own, and is in potency to receive any kind of form,⁴⁷ whereas proximate matter is predisposed by certain formal properties to receive only specific kinds of forms. To determine whether these dispositions present in proximate matter are real properties or not, Dymdsdale provides a classic example in the opening of his question:

IOHANNES DE TYTYNGSALE, <i>Quaestiones super Metaphysicam</i> VIII; in Durham, Cathedral Library, C IV.20, f. 153rb and Montpellier, Bibliothèque interuniversitaire, H 293, f. 107vb:	JOHANNES PICARDI VON LICHTENBERG 2025, <i>Quaestiones I–XIX</i> , 116, ll. 11–18:
Ad illud <i>dicendum</i> est secundum quosdam, <i>quod materia proxima aliquid reale addit super materiam primam.</i> Et hoc videtur sic, quia <i>forma non inducitur in quacumque materia, sed in materia disposita; sed materia non est disposita, nisi ut subiecta est aliquibus passionibus realibus.</i> <i>Praeterea corpus est materia animae, et corpus non solum importat materiam primam, sed aliquid additum.</i> <i>Sed ista non videntur concludere, quia, licet forma inducatur in materia disposita, dispositiones tamen non manent in inductione formae; dispositiones ergo non pertinent ad rationem materiae.</i> <i>Et similiter, licet anima sit actus corporis, anima tamen immediate perficit materiam,</i>	<i>Dicendum, quod dicunt quidam, quod materia proxima aliquid reale addit, quod videtur sic.</i> <i>Forma non inducitur in quacumque materia, sed in disposita, sed intantum dicitur disposita, quia subicitur passionibus realibus.</i> <i>Praeterea corpus est materia animae, sed id non est materia prima, sed aliquid additum.</i> <i>Ista non concludunt, quia, licet forma inducatur in materia disposita, dispositiones tamen non manent in inductione formae.</i> <i>Similiter licet anima sit actus corporis, anima tamen immediate perficit materiam,</i>

⁴⁶ See ARISTOTELES, AVERROES 1562-1574, vol. VIII, *In Metaphysicam*, VIII, 11, f. 219rA–E; VINCENTIUS BELLOVACENSIS 1624, 1546–1547; ALBERTUS MAGNUS 1960–1964, 220, ll. 36–50 and 401, l. 33–402, l. 7 and THOMAS DE AQUINO 1971, 414a–415b.

⁴⁷ Cf. for example HAMESSE 1974, 144, ll. 91–92 and AVERROES 2025, 175, ll. 31–33.

<i>nec est forma corporis tamquam medium uniens animam cum materia, licet anima non possit induci in materia nisi prius inducta forma corporis.</i>	<i>quae est sub forma corporis, nec forma corporis est medium, sed dispositiones ad omnia.</i>
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Here, Dymdale examines and refutes the argument that the soul does not inform prime matter in constituting an animated substance on the grounds that the soul's matter is the body. This claim would imply that prime matter and body differ, since the body would add certain real features to prime matter. Furthermore, the body would then be regarded as the proximate matter of the soul because it predisposes prime matter to specifically acquire the form of the soul.

Dymdale replies to this argument arguing that although the substantial form of the soul is brought into a disposed matter – namely, the matter of the body – the dispositions proper to the corporeal substance do not remain once the substantial form of the soul is introduced in it. This indicates that such dispositions do not pertain to the nature of matter itself. Moreover, the soul, as a more perfect substantial form than that of the body, brings into matter all the perfections and dispositions that are proper to itself, including also those of the body. In this sense, the form of the body does not play any intermediary role between the form of the soul and matter; rather, the union between the soul and prime matter is immediate. On the other hand, since the form of the soul includes all the perfections and properties of the form of the body – properties required to predispose matter to receive the ultimate perfection of the soul – this ultimate perfection must be conferred upon matter only after the perfections of the body. Only in this sense, it can be said that the soul is the act of the body.

To resume, the metaphysical union that produces a composite substance occurs directly between prime matter and substantial form, without the mediation of any intermediate element, such as proximate matter – as in the case of the soul and the body. However, for prime matter to receive the soul as its ultimate perfection, it must first be disposed by the perfections proper to the body, and these are conferred by the soul itself. In this specific case, this entails that prime matter and the proximate matter of the body never exist separate-

ly,⁴⁸ since both exist within the same complete substance, which arises from the immediate union of prime matter with the soul's substantial form. For the same reason, the proximate matter of the body does not add any real feature to prime matter, as proximate matter never exists apart from the complete substance, just as prime matter itself does not.

In continuity with this, Dymsdale offers his final answer to the problem of the difference between prime and proximate matter in the *solutio* of his question. Again, Picard employs Dymsdale's text word-for-word:

IOHANNES DE TYTYNGSALE, <i>Quaestiones super Metaphysicam</i> VIII; Durham, Cathedral Library, C IV.20, f. 153rb–va and Montpellier, Bibliothèque interuniversitaire, H 293, ff. 107vb–108ra:	JOHANNES PICARDI VON LICHTENBERG 2025, <i>Quaestiones I–XIX</i> , 116, l. 19–117, l. 36:
<i>Unde ad quaestionem dicendum est, quod materia proxima nihil reale addit super materiam primam, alicui tamen reali coniungitur, cui non necessario coniungitur materia prima.</i> <i>Declaratio primi est: Si materia proxima aliquid reale adderet super materiam primam, aut formam accidentalem aut substantialem. Si accidentalem, duo sequentur inconvenientia. Primum est, quod forma accidentalis praecedet formam substantialem in materia. Secundum est, quod forma accidentalis participabit ad quiditatem speciei. Si autem addat formam substantialem, aut ergo illa forma est forma diminuta, quae postea fiat completa forma rei, et hoc improbatum est in VII, aut erit forma substantialis perfecta et completa, et tunc forma adveniens posterius erit accidens, quod videtur impossibile.</i> <i>Declaratio secundi est: Materia prima nullam formam sibi determinat substan-</i>	<i>Unde dicendum est ad quaestionem, quod nihil reale addit, materia tamen proxima alicui reali coniungitur, cui non coniungitur materia prima.</i> <i>Declaratio primi est, quia, si materia proxima aliquid reale adderet super materiam primam, aut formam essentialem aut accidentalem. Si accidentalem, duo sequuntur inconvenientia: Primum est, quod forma accidentalis praecedet inductionem formae substantialis in materia. Secundum est, quod forma accidentalis participabit quiditatem speciei; si addit substantialem, aut ergo formam diminutam, quae postea fiat completa, et hoc improbatum est, aut erit forma perfecta substantialis, et tunc forma posterius adveniens est accidens, quod est impossibile.</i> <i>Declaratio secundi est: Materia prima nullam sibi formam determinat,</i>

48 See also *infra*, Appendix, *Utrum una sit materia omnium numero ut materia prima*, 183: “Praeterea nullus diceret, quod materia proxima omnium est una numero; sed materia proxima omnium et materia prima non sunt separata realiter; ergo etc.”

tialem nec accidentalem, immo cum materiam absolute apprehendimus, apprehendimus ipsam, ut prima est. <i>Sed materia proxima diversorum coniuncta est cum diversis, quia materia chole- rae est amara et materia phlegmatis dulcis. Materia tamen remota utrius- que potest esse idem. Ergo materia proxima alicuius speciei cum aliquo coniungitur, cui non ex necessitate co- niungitur materia prima, inquantum prima est, sicut patet in liquabilibus, quia omnium liquabilium materia pri- ma est aqua. Manifestum tamen est, quod alia est materia proxima secundum determinationem Philosophi in IV Me- teororum, ut auri et argenti et vini et olei. Dicendum est igitur, quod materia proxi- ma nihil reale addit super materiam pri- mam, immo differunt secundum rationem solum. Dicitur enim prima, ut indifferens est ad omnem dispositionem, et dicitur proxima, ut est subiecta determinatae dis- positioni, sicut materia dicitur naturalis, ut subiecta est qualitatibus sensibilibus, et dicitur mathematica, ut subiecta est dimensionibus, et dicitur prima, ut indif- ferens est ad haec et ad illa.</i> Et manifestum est, quod eadem rea- liter est materia, quae subicitur scilicet dimensionibus et qualitatibus sensibi- libus, et tamen de se neutrum horum determinat.	<i>sed materia proxima diversorum coniunc- ta est cum diversis.</i> Unde in IV Meteororum dicitur, quod alia est materia proxima auri, alia argenti, vini et olei. <i>Dicendum est igitur, quod materia proxi- ma nihil reale addit super materiam pri- mam, immo differunt secundum rationem solum. Dicitur enim prima, ut indifferens est ad omnem formam et dispositionem, proxima, ut subiecta est determinatae dis- positioni. Sic materia dicitur naturalis, ut subiecta est qualitatibus, et dicitur mathe- matica, ut subiecta est dimensionibus, et dicitur prima ut indifferens est ad hoc et hoc; tantum una materia est.</i>
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Dymsdale explicitly contends that proximate matter does not add any real property to prime matter. He substantiates this claim by demonstrating the impossibility of the contrary: if proximate matter were to add any real properties to prime matter, these properties would be either essential or accidental. Both options, however, lead to significant philosophical difficulties.

First, if proximate matter were to confer *accidental* properties to prime matter, then such properties belong to matter alone and are present prior to the introduction of the substantial form that brings the substance into existence. Yet, it is precisely the substantial form that grants matter its fundamental conditions of existence and formal nature, without which the resulting substance cannot be the subject of any accidental properties. It is therefore impossible for matter to bear accidental determinations before it has been actualized by the substantial form.

Furthermore, if certain accidental forms inhered in matter even before its union with the substantial form, these accidental features would then become constituents of the essence of the species produced. This would imply, for instance, that if the accidental property of quantity belonged to matter alone, inasmuch as it disposes prime matter to receive a particular kind of substantial form, then the essence of the species 'human being' would be defined by the sum of its substantial form together with the specific quantitative dispositions of its proximate matter. Here is a hypothetical example of my own: the definition of a human being would become 'a rational animal that has fixed and determined dimensions', such as being 1.80 meters tall and weighing 70 kilograms. But this is absurd, since accidental properties vary from one individual of a species to another, and therefore cannot form part of the essential definition of the species.

Second, if proximate matter were to add *substantial form* to prime matter, two possibilities arise. Either the matter is disposed by a diminished version of the substantial form, which is completed only later through the action of an external agent, or it is disposed by a substantial form already complete in itself. In the first case, where the substantial form is diminished, then part of this form or the entire form would have to be created *ex nihilo*, as shown previously.⁴⁹ However, this conclusion directly contradicts the intention of those who uphold this same theory. In the second case, if the substantial form is already complete, the proximate matter would already constitute a complete substance, and any subsequent form aiming to produce the substance would be merely accidental. Clearly, this too is impossible. It conflicts, moreover, with the very definition of

⁴⁹ See *supra*, 152–154.

proximate matter, which is meant to be matter only disposed through accidental properties so as to acquire a complete substantial form.

Through his whole refutation, Dymdale shows that proximate matter cannot confer any real properties upon prime matter. However, he concedes that while proximate matter does not add real properties to prime matter, it does combine with real properties that prime matter itself does not possess. Indeed, when apprehended by the intellect, the material principle of an existing substance can be understood either as devoid of any form or as combined with certain real properties, such as dispositions. In this sense, it is appropriate to distinguish between different kinds of matter (namely, natural, mathematical and metaphysical), since the same existing material principle can be conceived both as endowed with various real properties (such as primary qualities and dimensions), which are all provided by the substantial form, and as not being determined by any form.

Thus, just as in the case of the potential unity of prime matter, the distinction between prime and proximate matter can be properly made only at the level of the intellect; in reality, both prime and proximate matter never exist or differ in themselves, since what exists in actuality is always and only the complete and perfected substance resulting from the union of prime matter with the substantial form.

To conclude, the analysis of the *solutio* to this final question has shown that Dymdale's text plays a decisive role in all three questions present in Picard's *Quaestiones*. This definitively demonstrates that in composing his work, Picard deemed Dymdale's arguments to be the most reliable and compelling in supporting the view that there is no *forma diminuta* nor *inchoatio formae* within matter and, accordingly, no real difference between prime matter and proximate matter.

4. Conclusion

I have reconstructed some essential features of John Dymdale's theory of prime and proximate matter and highlighted its significant impact on John Picard's metaphysical understanding – seen clearly in the extensive textual borrow-

ings that Picard makes from Dymsdale's original version. My analysis of the surviving correspondences between Dymsdale's and Picard's works confirms Ermatinger's 1988 discovery that Picard's questions 12–14 are almost a literal reproduction of Dymsdale's text. Taken together, these conclusions, along with those reached by the recent studies of Fiorella Retucci,⁵⁰ converge in revealing a substantial transmission of scientific ideas from Oxford to Cologne in the late Middle Ages.

A fact appears evident: to edit and investigate the sources of medieval texts that appear neither theoretically innovative nor prominent in the history of philosophy is comparable to creating the liminal spaces that hold an architectural structure together.

Liminal spaces are in-between places that exist as means to an end, meant to be passed through rather than dwelt in, such as staircases, hallways, or hotel rooms.⁵¹ They hold no real meaning on their own, but function only as a passage to other, more significant places. Liminal spaces are connecting points and naturally prompt curiosity about what lies in the rooms beyond them.⁵²

In the same fashion, authors and works like Picard's and Dymsdale's *Quaestiones* cannot be regarded as main rooms in the huge building of the history of medieval philosophy. They represent neither revolutionary nor influential developments of scholastic thought. Notwithstanding, they fulfill an equally essential function for medieval historiography. Indeed, it is an established historical fact that dialogue between scholars from different regions, *milieux* and universities took place during the Middle Ages. Like the liminal spaces in architectural structures, the study of implicit sources and intertextual references underlying authors such as John Picard of Lichtenberg and John Dymsdale provides one of the most effective means for interpreting this dialogue with greater precision. Through such investigations, we can achieve a more nuanced awareness of the relationships among intellectual *milieux*, such as the otherwise hidden link between the Dominican *Studium generale* of Cologne and the faculty of arts at Oxford. For this reason, these authors function as privileged gateways

50 See RETUCCI 2019, RETUCCI 2021 and RETUCCI 2025. On this, see also LASORELLA 2025(3).

51 XIAO 2021.

52 KOCH 2020.

for understanding how medieval philosophical thought actually took shape within its material contexts. To maintain the architectural metaphor: they are the corridors, stairways, and passageways through which the building of medieval philosophy acquires its historical foundations and structural coherence.

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APPENDIX

The questions here edited are present in the following manuscripts: Durham, Cathedral Library, C IV.20, fols. 1ra–196va (= *D*) and Montpellier, Bibliothèque interuniversitaire, H 293, fols. 84ra–131ra (= *M*). The respective digitalized versions are available to readers on the following websites: <https://iiif.biblissima.fr/collections/manifest/e4355a227657cb78730d3e9e29540369687cff53> and https://ged.scdi-montpellier.fr/florabium45/jsp/nodoc.jsp?NODOC=2013_DOC_MON1_MBUM_37 (accessed 18 February 2026). The Latin text of the manuscripts has been punctuated and its orthography normalized in accordance with modern criteria for the Latin language. The text of manuscript *D* has been chosen as the base text, since it transmits the work in its entirety and is easier to read, whereas manuscript *M* contains several textual *lacunae*. The text of *D* has been emended on the basis of *M* only in those cases in which the reading of *D* is manifestly erroneous. Nevertheless, it was also deemed important to highlight the relationship with the text transmitted in Picard's *Quaestiones* (= *Licht.*). To this end, instances of agreement between *M* and Picard have been recorded in the critical apparatus, in negative form. Any further modification has been noted in the apparatus of variants. All explicit sources have been identified and recorded in the *apparatus fontium*, and implicit sources have likewise been indicated whenever possible.

| D 127rb et M 92ra |

«Utrum in materia sit aliqua forma diminuta vel inchoatio formae, quae postea fiat forma rei, etsi non sit aliquod principium activum»

Nunc quaeritur, utrum in materia sit aliqua forma diminuta sive inchoatio formae, quae postea fiat¹ forma rei², etsi non sit aliquod principium activum.

Et videtur quod sic. Agens extrahit formam a materia secundum Commentatorem in multis locis³ⁱ; sed nihil abstrahitur | M 92rb | ab aliquo, nisi prius fuerit in esse; ergo forma prius fuit in⁴ materia et non completa; ergo etc⁵.

Praeterea hoc est impossibile secundum⁶ Commentatorem in XII⁷ⁱⁱ: “Forma fit ex non forma”; ergo necessario fiet ex forma et non completa; ergo etc⁸.

Praeterea nisi⁹ in materia esset forma diminuta, quae postea fiat¹⁰ forma rei, forma totaliter fieret ab extrinseco¹¹, et sic esset dator¹² formarumⁱⁱⁱ.

Praeterea forma est¹³ in materia; aut ergo processit ex aliquo aut ex nihilo. Non ex nihilo, quia inter aliquid et nihil¹⁴ est infinita distantia, quae¹⁵ non potest

1 postea fiat: posset esse M

2 rei: postea *add.* M

3 in multis locis *om.* M

4 in *add.* e *sed exp.* M

5 etc.: diminuta M

6 secundum: apud M

7 in XII *om.* M

8 etc.: diminuta M *et Licht.* (cf. JOHANNES PICARDI VON LICHTENBERG 2025, 109, l. 8)

9 nisi: non M

10 postea fiat: post fieret M

11 extrinseco: externo M

12 et sic esset dator: et ita esset ponere datores M

13 est: ex n *sed exp.* M

14 aliquid et nihil: nihil et agens M

15 quae: quod D

transiri¹⁶ per agens finitae virtutis^{17iv}. Nec¹⁸ ex aliquo, quia non¹⁹ ex aliquo ut ex²⁰ materia, quia²¹ tunc materia esset pars formae; ergo erit ex aliquo, quod est pars formae, et²² talis est forma diminuta; ergo etc²³. Si dicatur²⁴, quod forma non fit²⁵ per se, sed²⁶ per accidens, idem argumentum²⁷.

Ad oppositum. Apud generationem substantiae non est forma diminuta de genere perfectionis illius, ad quam tendit generatio²⁸, secundum Commentatorem in V *Physicae*^{29v}; ergo etc.

Ad illud dicitur, quod in materia necesse est praeesse formam diminutam, quae postea fiat forma rei, alioquin fieret ex nihilo et esset formae³⁰ creatio. Sed istud non videtur esse verum, quia indivisibile, ubi est, totaliter est; sed forma substantialis est indivisibilis; ergo ubi est, totaliter est. Si igitur in materia praefuit, totaliter praefuit; et tunc sequitur positio³¹ Anaxagorae^{vi}, quod quidlibet sit in³² quolibet actu, quod est impossibile.

Praeterea ista positio incidit in illud³³ idem, quod vitare intendit³⁴. Nam quaero, utrum forma completa aliquid addat supra³⁵ diminutam vel non. Si nihil addat, ergo forma completa praefuit. Si aliquid addat, illud³⁶ additum non praefuit et per consequens illud³⁷ additum fieret³⁸ ex nihilo.

16 transiri: transire M

17 per agens finitae virtutis *om.* M

18 Nec: necesse *sed corr.* M

19 non *om.* M

20 ut ex: quod est M

21 quia *om.* M

22 et *om.* M

23 ergo etc. *om.* M

24 dicatur: dicitur M

25 fit: fiat M

26 per se sed: nisi M

27 idem argumentum *add.* contra ipsum D

28 generatio *dub.* M

29 Physicae *om.* D

30 formae: formarum M

31 positio: opinio M *et Licht.* (cf. JOHANNES PICARDI VON LICHTENBERG 2025, 109, l. 19)

32 in: ex M

33 illud: id M *et Licht.* (cf. JOHANNES PICARDI VON LICHTENBERG 2025, 109, l. 20)

34 intendit *add.* propositio *dub.* D

35 supra *add.* formam M *et Licht.* (cf. JOHANNES PICARDI VON LICHTENBERG 2025, 109, l. 21)

36 illud: id M *et Licht.* (cf. JOHANNES PICARDI VON LICHTENBERG 2025, 109, l. 22)

37 illud: id M *et Licht.* (cf. JOHANNES PICARDI VON LICHTENBERG 2025, 109, l. 23)

38 fieret *coni.*: fiet DM

Praeterea istud ponitur, ne ponatur forma fieri ex nihilo, sed istud videtur esse concedendum. Ostendit | D 127va | enim Philosophus in VII^{vii}, quod forma non fit ex aliquo. Sed forte³⁹ dicetur, quod Philosophus ostendit formam non fieri ex aliquo sicut ex materia, non tamen negat, quin fiat ex aliquo tamquam ex forma diminuta⁴⁰.

Sed contra⁴¹. Materia est id⁴², ex quo fit aliquid tamquam inexistente⁴³, et inest, cum factum est; sed ista ratio convenit formae diminutae, si ex ipsa fieret forma completa; ergo si Philosophus negat formam fieri uno modo ut⁴⁴ ex materia, et⁴⁵ negat ipsam fieri ex forma diminuta.

Ad illud potest dici⁴⁶, quod aliter⁴⁷ est de materia et de forma diminuta, quia per generationem materia fit⁴⁸ sub forma⁴⁹ completa, sed forma diminuta fit⁵⁰ ipsa forma completa.

Contra⁵¹. Quaero⁵², utrum forma completa et forma diminuta⁵³ sint eiusdem essentiae vel non. Si non, non magis fieret haec illa quam forma aeris forma ignis. Si sint⁵⁴ eiusdem essentiae, aut ergo tota forma completa praefuit, et sic esset⁵⁵ latitatio formarum^{viii}, aut⁵⁶ forma diminuta est pars formae completae⁵⁸, et sic substantia susciperet⁵⁹ magis et minus. Si dicatur, quod⁶⁰ tota forma completa

39 forte *om.* M

40 Philosophus negat formam fieri uno modo ut ex materia, et negat ipsam fieri ex forma diminuta: negat formam fieri ex aliquo ut ex materia completa D

41 contra *add.* istud D

42 id: illud D

43 tamquam inexistente *om.* M

44 uno modo ut *om.* M

45 et *om.* D

46 Ad illud potest dici: si diceretur M

47 aliter *add.* se *sed exp.* M

48 materia fit *inv.* M

49 forma *add.* diminuta *sed exp.* D

50 fit: sit M

51 contra: sed contra id D

52 quaero: quaerit M

53 completa et forma diminuta: diminuta et completa M

54 sint *om.* M

55 esset: est M *et Licht.* (cf. JOHANNES PICARDI VON LICHTENBERG 2025, 110, l. 35)

56 aut *add.* pars eius est et *sed exp.* M

57 aut *add.* ipsa M

58 formae completae: eius M

59 susciperet: suscipit M

60 dicatur quod: dicendum M

praefuit, sed tantum in potentia, arguo tunc sic: Si ipsa⁶¹ tota forma praefuit in potentia, aut ita, quod nihil eius praefuit⁶², sed solum materia fuit in potentia ad ipsam – et sic⁶³ habetur propositum, quod forma diminuta non praefuit –, aut ipsa tota praefuit prius in potentia ita, quod nihil per generationem acquiritur – et sic non differrent esse actu et esse in potentia –, aut ita, quod⁶⁴ aliquid acquiritur⁶⁵ per generationem⁶⁶ et illud non praefuit – ergo illud non fiet⁶⁷ ex aliquo.

Ad quaestionem⁶⁸ dicendum, quod⁶⁹, sicut dicit⁷⁰ Commentator in XI huius^{71x} | M 92va |, circa istam quaestionem duae fuerunt opiniones⁷² extremae. Una ponit⁷³ formam totaliter⁷⁴ et semper praefuisse in materia⁷⁵, et haec ponit⁷⁶ latitudinem formarum et⁷⁷ fuit positio Anaxagorae⁷⁸. Alia ponit formam sive rem totaliter⁷⁹, et quantum ad formam⁸⁰ et quantum ad materiam⁸¹, de novo esse, et si⁸² loquamur⁸³ de prima rerum productione, haec est opinio Christianorum. Sed inter istas duas opiniones⁸⁴ extremas⁸⁵ sunt tres mediae, quae nec ponunt rem totaliter praefuisse nec de novo esse⁸⁶. Quarum una ponit formam causari⁸⁷

61 ipsa *om.* M

62 praefuit *om.* M

63 et sic: sic quod M

64 quod *om.* M

65 acquiritur: acquiretur D

66 per generationem *om.* M

67 fiet: fieret D

68 Ad quaestionem: est M

69 quod *om.* D et *Licht.* (cf. JOHANNES PICARDI VON LICHTENBERG 2025, 110, l. 43)

70 dicit: tractat *dub.* M

71 XI huius: XII huius *sed exp. et corr.* M

72 opiniones: positiones M

73 ponit: posuit M

74 totaliter *add.* fieri *ext sed exp.* M

75 in materia *add. sup.lin.* M

76 ponit: posuit M

77 et *add.* haec *om.* M

78 Anaxagorae *add.* et M

79 formam sive rem totaliter: materiam *sed exp.* M

80 formam: materiam M et *Licht.* (cf. JOHANNES PICARDI VON LICHTENBERG 2025, 110, l. 45)

81 materiam: formam M et *Licht.* (cf. JOHANNES PICARDI VON LICHTENBERG 2025, 110, l. 46)

82 si *add.* autem M

83 loquamur: loquimur D

84 opiniones *add.* me *sed exp.* D

85 extremas: extremae D

86 praefuisse nec de novo esse: de novo esse, nec totaliter non esse M

87 causari: causare M

in materia praeexistente⁸⁸ ab aliqua⁸⁹ intelligentia | D 127vb | separata, et haec est opinio⁹⁰ Avicennae. Alia ponit formam causari⁹¹ in materia ab aliqua forma separata⁹² eiusdem speciei, et haec est opinio⁹³ Platonis. Aristoteles autem⁹⁴ viam mediam tenet, nec⁹⁵ ponit formam⁹⁶ totaliter fieri⁹⁷ ab extra⁹⁸ nec totaliter ab intra⁹⁹, sed partim ab extra¹⁰⁰ et partim ab intra¹⁰¹: ab intra, quia ex potentia¹⁰² materiae, ab extra, quia ab agente extrinseco¹⁰³.

Sed circa istam¹⁰⁴ opinionem dupliciter se habent moderni, quia¹⁰⁵, quod¹⁰⁶ forma educatur de¹⁰⁷ potentia materiae potest esse dupliciter¹⁰⁸: aut ita¹⁰⁹ quod praesit aliqua forma¹¹⁰ diminuta in materia¹¹¹ aut non¹¹². Quod¹¹³ praesit talis forma diminuta, quae postea fiat forma completa¹¹⁴, multi ponunt, ne ponant formam

88 praeexistente *om.* D

89 aliqua *om.* *M et Licht.* (cf. JOHANNES PICARDI VON LICHTENBERG 2025, 110, l. 49)

90 opinio: positio M

91 causari: causare M

92 aliqua forma separata: agente separato *M et Licht.* (cf. JOHANNES PICARDI VON LICHTENBERG 2025, 110, l. 50)

93 opinio: positio M

94 Aristoteles autem: Sed Aristoteles *M et Licht.* (cf. JOHANNES PICARDI VON LICHTENBERG 2025, 110, l. 50)

95 nec: Aristoteles autem D

96 formam *add.* nec D

97 fieri *om.* M

98 extra: extrinseco M

99 intra: intrinseco M

100 extra: intra *M et Licht.* (cf. JOHANNES PICARDI VON LICHTENBERG 2025, 110, l. 50)

101 intra: extra *M et Licht.* (cf. JOHANNES PICARDI VON LICHTENBERG 2025, 110, l. 51)

102 potentia *add.* et *sed exp.* D

103 ab agente extrinseco: per actionem agentis extrinseci M

104 istam *om.* M

105 quia *om.* et *add.* as *sed exp.* D

106 quod *add.* autem D

107 de *add.* essen *sed exp.* M

108 potest esse dupliciter *om.* M

109 ita *om.* *M et Licht.* (cf. JOHANNES PICARDI VON LICHTENBERG 2025, 110, l. 55)

110 forma *coni.*: potentia *DM et Licht.* (cf. JOHANNES PICARDI VON LICHTENBERG 2025, 110, l. 55)

111 diminuta in materia *om.* D

112 non *add.* et M

113 Quod *add.* autem D

114 talis forma diminuta quae postea fiat forma completa *om.* *M et Licht.* (cf. JOHANNES PICARDI VON LICHTENBERG 2025, 110, l. 56)

fieri ex nihilo. Sed quod¹¹⁵ necesse sit¹¹⁶ in omni motu et omni generatione¹¹⁷ aliquid esse, quod non praefuit et quod non fiat ex aliquo, ostendo sic¹¹⁸. Sit¹¹⁹ aliquod generatum ABCD, quaero utrum huius compositi¹²⁰ aliquid praefuit¹²¹ aut non. Si nihil, habeo propositum. Si aliquid, sit illud A, tunc quaero de residuo, utrum istius aliquid praefuit aut non. Si nihil, habeo propositum, quod aliquid est, quod prius non fuit¹²². Si aliquid praefuit, sit illud B, et quaero de residuo, et sic est necessario procedere in infinitum, quod est impossibile, vel oportet devenire ad aliquid, cuius nihil praefuit, et tunc habetur propositum, vel oportet ponere, quod totum generatum praefuit, et tunc est auferre omnem generationem.

Praeterea omnes istam positionem tenentes ponunt aliquid actu esse¹²³ post generationem, quod non praefuit in actu completo. Sed tunc quaero de ista¹²⁴ completionem et actualitate. Et arguo, quia¹²⁵ non praefuit, quia¹²⁶ si sic, nihil esset acquisitum per generationem, et ista actualitas nunc est¹²⁷ et non praefuit, ergo aliquid est, quod non fit ex aliquo.

Dicendum est igitur, quod in omni generatione est aliquid per generationem acquisitum, quod non praefuit nec ex aliquo fit per se¹²⁸. Sed istud non potest esse minus quam indivisibile nec aliud quam terminus generationis. Cum ergo | D 128ra | forma sit indivisibilis et finis generationis, istud necessario est forma. Si dicatur¹²⁹, quod forma sit¹³⁰ divisibilis¹³¹, istud videtur contra mentem

115 quod *add.* hoc M

116 necesse sit: sit necessarium M

117 et omni generatione *om.* D

118 ostendo sic *inv.* M

119 Sit *om.* M

120 compositi *om.* M

121 praefuit: praesit M

122 fuit: fit M

123 actu esse: esse in actu completo M

124 ista *om.* M

125 Et arguo, quia: Ipsa enim M

126 quia *om.* M

127 actualitas nunc est: est nunc actualitas M

128 per se *om.* M

129 dicatur: dicitur M

130 sit: est M

131 divisibilis *add.* et M

Philosophi¹³², quia tunc generatio esset motus et forma substantialis¹³³ susciperet¹³⁴ magis et minus. Sed dato, quod sit divisibilis, adhuc habetur¹³⁵ propositum, quia quantitas est divisibilis¹³⁶, et tamen aliquis gradus quantitatis est in fine augmentationis, qui non praecessit. Et in alteratione similiter, si ex aere fiat ignis, aliquis est gradus¹³⁷ caliditatis, qui non praefuit, quia in fine transmutationis est caliditas proportionata¹³⁸ igni, quae est improporcionata¹³⁹ aeri. Igitur sive forma sit divisibilis sive non, semper aliquid esset in fine transmutationis, quod prius non fuit¹⁴⁰. Unde quantum ad hoc, non est differentia inter inductionem formae substantialis et accidentalis¹⁴¹.

Dicendum est igitur¹⁴², quod in materia non est forma diminuta, quae postea fit forma rei, nec tamen creatur, quia creatio est productio existentis¹⁴³ | M 92vb | et forma non habet esse per se, sed per compositum^{144x}, nec fit ex nihilo, sed non fit ex aliquo¹⁴⁵, scilicet¹⁴⁶ ex nihilo vel non ex aliquo fit¹⁴⁷, quia¹⁴⁸ refert¹⁴⁹ dicere ‘fit ex nihilo’ et ‘ex nihilo fit’, quia in prima affirmatur fieri et secunda negatur. Unde proprie dicendum est, quod forma non fit ex aliquo per se, etsi per accidens fiat, hoc est ex aliquo, quia ex materia. Non tamen ita, quod materia sit pars eius, quia hoc est proprium compositi, cuius est factio¹⁵⁰ per se.

132 Philosophi: philosophus M

133 forma substantialis: substantia D

134 susciperet: suscipiat *dub.* M

135 habetur: habeo M

136 est divisibilis *inv. et add.* ad quam est augmentatio M

137 est gradus *inv.* M

138 proportionata: proportionalis D

139 improporcionata: improporcionalis D

140 prius non fuit: non praefuit M

141 accidentalis *add.* sed sit differentia quantum ad divisibile (divisibile *coni.*: divisi M) esse ut patebit M

142 igitur: ergo D *et Licht.* (cf. JOHANNES PICARDI VON LICHTENBERG 2025, 111, l. 60)

143 existentis: formae vel entis per se D

144 sed per compositum *om.* M

145 aliquo: referet *sed exp.* M

146 scilicet *coni.*: sed D

147 fit *suppl.*: *om.* DM

148 sed ex nihilo vel non ex aliquo quia: vel ex nihilo M

149 refert: refertur M

150 factio: actio M

Ad rationes. Ad¹⁵¹ primam dicendum, quod educere, extrahere¹⁵² improprie accipiuntur¹⁵³ in generatione. Quia tamen quidam^{xi} posuerunt¹⁵⁴ formas extra materiam fieri et postea¹⁵⁵ in materia imprimi, Commentator^{xii} volens innuere, quod hoc sit¹⁵⁶ extra mentem Philosophi, dicit, quod agens educit formam de materia vel extrahit¹⁵⁷, cum tamen nihil proprie¹⁵⁸ extrahatur¹⁵⁹ ab aliquo, nisi idem numero praefuisset¹⁶⁰ in eo. Sed sicut dicimus, quod lumen et caliditas¹⁶¹ transeunt a sole per medium, cum tamen nihil sit in medio, quod prius fuit in sole, sic loquitur Commentator in proposito extensione¹⁶².

Ad aliud dicendum, quod Commentator^{xiii} non dicit quod forma non fit¹⁶³ ex non forma pro eo, quod non fit extra materiam, immo¹⁶⁴ fit in materia, quae praefuit | D 128rb | sub alia.

Ad aliud dicendum, quod etsi non sit talis forma, non tamen fit forma per se¹⁶⁵¹⁶⁶ ab extrinseco nisi pro tanto, quod fit per actionem agentis extrinseci.

Ad ultimam dicendum, quod forma¹⁶⁷ non fit ex nihilo proprie¹⁶⁸, sed ex aliquo, ut est materia, non tamen¹⁶⁹ ita quod materia sit pars eius, quia hoc debetur eis, quae¹⁷⁰ per se fiunt.

151 rationes ad: rationem *M*

152 educere, extrahere: extrahere, reducere *M*

153 accipiuntur *add. et sed exp. D*

154 posuerunt *add. scilicet D*

155 postea: post *M*

156 innuere quod hoc sit: hoc innuere esse *M*

157 de materia vel extrahit *om. M*

158 nihil proprie *inv. M*

159 extrahatur: extrahit *M*

160 praefuisset *dub. an praefuissi M*

161 caliditas: aliditas *sed corr. D*

162 extensione *dub. DM*

163 non dicit quod forma non fit: dicit forma fieri *M et Licht.* (cf. JOHANNES PICARDI VON LICHTENBERG 2025, 111, l. 70)

164 immo: sed *M*

165 per se *dub. M*

166 non tamen fit forma per se: tamen forma per se non fit *M*

167 quod forma *illeg. M*

168 proprie *om. M et Licht.* (cf. JOHANNES PICARDI VON LICHTENBERG 2025, 111, l. 76)

169 non tamen: sed non *M*

170 quae *illeg. M*

Intelligendum tamen est, quod¹⁷¹ in generatione artificialium et naturalium¹⁷² est quaedam aptitudo materiae ad formam¹⁷³, quia non quaelibet forma inducitur in quamlibet materiam, sed in ferro¹⁷⁴ inducitur forma serrae¹⁷⁵, quia aptum est ibi esse, nec anima¹⁷⁶ in quocumque corpore¹⁷⁷, sed in corpore¹⁷⁸ disposito¹⁷⁹. Si vero ista aptitudo vocetur forma diminuta vel principium activum pro eo¹⁸⁰, quod semper per transformationem¹⁸¹ magis et magis¹⁸² attuatur, sic concedo, quod forma diminuta et principium activum praesunt in materia naturalium et artificialium. Ista tamen aptitudo numquam fiet forma rei.

Liber VIII Metaphysicae (D, 152rb–153rb; M, 107rb–vb)

| D 152rb et M 107rb |

⟨Utrum materia prima sit una omnium numero⟩

Nunc quaeritur, utrum una materia prima sit una omnium numero¹⁸³¹⁸⁴.

Et videtur quod sic. Illud¹⁸⁵, ad quod stat resolutio omnium generabilium, est unum numero; sed materia prima¹⁸⁶ est huiusmodi; ergo etc. Maior patet per Philosophum in II *Metaphysicae*^{xiv}, ubi dicit, quod status est in omni causa; sed

171 quod *add.* et *M*

172 artificialium et naturalium: naturalium et artificialium *M*

173 formam *illeg.* *M*

174 in ferro *om.* et *add.* non fit e *sed exp.* *M*

175 inducitur forma serre: forma enim serre non inducitur *M*

176 quia aptus est ibi esse, nec anima *om.* *M*

177 quocumque corpore: quamlibet materiam *dub.* *M*

178 corpore: materiam *M*

179 disposito: disposita et *add.* sive in *sed exp.* *M*

180 eo *illeg.* *M*

181 transformationem *add.* semper *D*

182 magis *illeg.* *M*

183 una materia prima sit una omnium numero: una sit materia omnium numero (numero *add. sup. lin.*) ut materia prima *D*

184 numero *add.* generabilium et corruptibilium *M*

185 Illud: id *M* et *Licht.* (cf. JOHANNES PICARDI VON LICHTENBERG 2025, 112, l. 3)

186 prima *om.* *M*

in causa efficiente et finali est devenire ad aliquod¹⁸⁷ unum primum¹⁸⁸ numero; ergo et in causis materialibus.

Praeterea omnis distinctio est ab actu^{xv}; sed pura potentialitas omem actum excludit^{xvi}; ergo et¹⁸⁹ omnem distinctionem; cum ergo materia prima sit in pura potentia, ipsa¹⁹⁰ numero¹⁹¹ non est¹⁹² distincta¹⁹³. | D 152va |

Praeterea secundum Philosophum in I *De generatione*^{xvii} “melius est facere materiam in omnibus inseparatam entem unam numero” quam plures. Et in proposito¹⁹⁴ dicit Philosophus¹⁹⁵, quod de substantia materiali¹⁹⁶ non oportet latere, quod est una omnium, licet materiae proximae sint¹⁹⁷ diversae.

Praeterea resolvantur duo corruptibilia in suas materias; facta resolutione¹⁹⁸ quaero, utrum materiae¹⁹⁹ sint distinctae vel non.

Si adhuc sint distinctae, sic²⁰⁰ non salvatur²⁰¹ positum, quia omnis distinctio est ab actu^{xviii}.

Si non sint²⁰² distinctae, ergo sunt unum numero.

Ad oppositum. Illa sunt unum²⁰³ numero, quorum materia est una²⁰⁴ numero^{xix}; sed non omnia sunt unum numero; ergo etc²⁰⁵.

Praeterea materia substantiatur per posse^{xx}; sed non omnium est una potentia, quia alia est potentia in semine equi et hominis²⁰⁶; ergo²⁰⁷ etc.

187 aliquod: aliquid M

188 unum primum *inv.* M

189 et *om.* M

190 in pura potentia ipsa: una M

191 numero *add.* ipsa M

192 est: potest esse M

193 distincta *add.* numero M

194 Et in proposito: Et hoc M

195 Philosophus *add.* d *sed exp.* D

196 materiali: immateriali M

197 sint: sit M

198 resolutione: autem distinctione D *add.* dis *sed exp.* M

199 materiae *add.* sed M

200 sic *om.* D

201 salvatur: servatur D

202 sint: sunt D

203 unum: una D

204 una: unum D

205 etc.: non omnium erit materia una numero M

206 quia alia est potentia in semine equi et hominis: in equo et in asino M

207 ergo: ideo M

Praeterea si materia esset una²⁰⁸, aut ergo secundum esse aut secundum essentiam^{209xxi}. Si secundum esse, ergo²¹⁰ tantum una erit forma²¹¹. Si secundum essentiam, ergo principiata²¹² non erunt diversa essentialiter²¹³, quia diversitas compositorum est ex diversitate principiorum²¹⁴ essentialium.

Praeterea si una esset materia omnium²¹⁵, ex quolibet posset fieri²¹⁶ quidlibet, et ita²¹⁷ ex semine hominis posset²¹⁸ fieri asinus²¹⁹.

Dicendum est²²⁰, quod, sicut aliquid est ens, sic est unum, et sic talis est quaerenda unitas in unoquoque qualis est entitas²²¹; sed materia²²² secundum se et de se²²³ est ens in potentia²²⁴; in ipsa ergo solum est quaerenda²²⁵ unitas in potentia. Cum ergo quaeritur, utrum una sit materia prima²²⁶ omnium generabilium et corruptibilium, dicendum, quod est loqui de materia prima²²⁷²²⁸ dupliciter: aut secundum quod est sub forma²²⁹ aut circumscribendo omnem formam. Si secundum quod est sub forma, sic planum²³⁰ est, quod non est una numero²³¹, quia impossibile est aliquid unum et idem²³² esse in diversis locis et²³³ moveri

208 materia esset una: sic *M*

209 secundum esse aut secundum essentiam: secundum essentiam materia esset una aut secundum esse *M*

210 ergo: tunc *M*

211 tantum una erit forma: una erit forma tantum *M*

212 principiata *lac. M*

213 essentialiter: secundum essentia *M*

214 principiorum *lac. M*

215 omnium *om. M et Licht.* (cf. JOHANNES PICARDI VON LICHTENBERG 2025, 113, l. 19)

216 posset fieri: fieret *M*

217 et ita *om. M*

218 posset: possit *M*

219 asinus: leo sicut et homo *M*

220 est *om. M et Licht.* (cf. JOHANNES PICARDI VON LICHTENBERG 2025, 113, l. 20)

221 sic talis est quaerenda unitas in unoquoque qualis est entitas: qualis est entitas in unoquoque talis est unitas quaerenda *M*

222 materia *add. solum M*

223 et de se *om. M*

224 ens in potentia: in potentia ens *M*

225 est quaerenda *inv. M et Licht.* (cf. JOHANNES PICARDI VON LICHTENBERG 2025, 113, l. 22)

226 prima *om. M*

227 prima *om. sed add. sup. lin. M*

228 materia prima *inv. M*

229 sub forma: actuata per formam *D*

230 planum: manifestum *M*

231 numero *add. omnium. M*

232 aliquid unum et idem: idem numero *M*

233 et: vel *M*

diversis²³⁴ motibus. Sed ubi est compositum, ibi est²³⁵ materia per accidens, et si moveatur²³⁶ compositum, movetur²³⁷ materia per accidens. Nunc autem ignis et aqua possunt esse in diversis locis et moveri motibus contrariis; ergo etc²³⁸.

Praeterea nullus diceret, quod materia proxima²³⁹ omnium est una numero; sed materia proxima²⁴⁰ et materia²⁴¹ prima non sunt separata realiter²⁴²; ergo²⁴³ etc.

Si loquamur | D 152vb | de materia prima circumscribendo omnem formam substantialem et accidentalem, particularem²⁴⁴ et universalem²⁴⁵, sic dico adhuc²⁴⁶, quod materia prima non est una numero omnium, | M 107va | una tamen est secundum rationem, quia materia negatione²⁴⁷ ostenditur sicut et genus per Philosophum²⁴⁸ in X^{xxii}. Sed sicut²⁴⁹ qui circumscribit a genere omnem differentiam²⁵⁰, nullam in genere percipit distinctionem (sed²⁵¹ hoc non obstante genus realiter est diversum), sic qui apprehendit materiam per privationem omnium formarum, nullam multitudinem circa ipsam apprehendit, sed nec aliquam unitatem realem propter hoc sibi attribuit. Sed sic solum est una apud rationem, quia circumscriptio formarum non est extra intellectum^{xxiii}, realiter tamen ipsa materia est multa, quia unitas in ratione non concludit unitatem realem in re.

Unde circa istam quaestionem sunt diversae opiniones. Si tamen interius respicitur, non contrariantur. Ponentes enim materiam primam esse unam omnium ponunt ipsam esse unam per indifferentiam et privationem formarum^{xxiv}, et ponentes ipsam non esse unam ponunt ipsam non esse unam in re sicut nec formam primam^{xxv}. Unde unitas rationis non repugnat pluralitati in re.

234 diversis: contrariis M

235 est *add.* sua M

236 si moveatur: quo movetur M

237 movetur *add.* ibi M

238 etc.: impossibile est quod una materia numero sit in eis M

239 proxima: pp^{xa} D

240 proxima *add.* omnium M

241 materia *om.* M

242 non sunt separata realiter: realiter non sunt diverse M

243 ergo: ideo M

244 particularem: universaliter M

245 universalem: particulariter M

246 dico adhuc *inv.* M

247 negatione *lac.* M

248 Philosophum: Aristotelem M (cf. JOHANNES PICARDI VON LICHTENBERG 2025, 113, l. 32)

249 sicut *suppl.*: *om.* DM

250 differentiam: actum M

251 sed *coni.*: si D

Intelligendum tamen est, quod materia potest comparari ad diversa simul existentia vel ad diversa successive ex se invicem generata, quia, si ad diversa simul existentia, sic diversorum diversa est materia prima sicut et proxima, et hoc numero. Si ad diversa successive generata, sic una materia potest esse eorum. Una et eadem materia est aeris et ignis generati, quia subiectum generationis manet sub utroque termino, et ideo dicit Philosophus^{xxvi}, quod eadem est materia contrariorum, quod intelligendum est de generatis successive.

Ad primum argumentum dicendum, quod, cum dicitur, quod illud est unum numero, ad quod stat resolutio, dicendum quod hoc non est verum, immo requiritur ad hoc, non²⁵² quod illud ad quod stat resolutio sit idem numero, sed quod sit idem, scilicet et unum per indifferentiam et privationem, et quod non sit aliquid prius eo in suo genere.

Ad probationem dicendum, quod non est eadem ratio de causis extrinsecis, ut de fine et efficiente, et de materia et forma, quia materia et forma sunt principia intrinseca^{xxvii}, et ideo quot sunt principiata, tot sunt formae primae et materiae primae | D 153ra |, et sicut non est una forma omnium, sic nec²⁵³ est una materia omnium. Sed finis et efficiens sunt separata a principiatis, et ideo possibile est devenire ad unum principiatum numero.

Ad aliud dicendum, quod duplex est distinctio, scilicet actualis et potentialis. Pura potentialitas omnem distinctionem actualem excludit^{xxviii}, distinctionem tamen potentialem bene permittit. Et ideo sicut duae formae separatae distinguuntur actualiter, sic duae potentiae²⁵⁴ potentialiter.

Ad aliud dicendum, quod Philosophus intendit ibi^{xxix} ostendere, quod materia non est separata a magnitudine, et ideo sic habet intelligi littera: Melius circa omnes res ponere materiam inseparatam a magnitudine, scilicet entem unam numero cum magnitudine, ratione vero non unam, quam plures separatim existentes. Similiter quod Philosophus dicit in VIII, loquitur ibi de materia prima per privationem formarum.

Ad ultimum dicendum, si fiat resolutio duorum, quod materiae, post scilicet resolutionem, sunt duae, sed tamen se ipsis distinguuntur et non per formas.

252 non *suppl.*: *om.* D

253 nec *om.* sed *add. sup. lin.* D

254 potentiae *an* materiae *scrib.*? materiae *Licht.* (cf. JOHANNES PICARDI VON LICHTENBERG 2025, 114, l. 56)

Ad primam rationem ad oppositum, dicendum, quod Philosophus ibi^{xxx} loquitur de illis, quae sunt unum numero per materiam individualement, et praeter hoc ratio probat, quod materia non est una numero, et hoc conclusum est.

Ad aliud dicendum, quod licet non sit una potentia omnium, illud tamen, in quo fuerunt istae potentiae primo, unum est in omnibus per indifferentiam. Unde pluralitas potentialium non concludit pluralitatem in materia, quia in ista materia una numero est potentia ad omnem formam aut mediate aut immediate. Unde quod Commentator dicit, quod materia substantiatur per posse, quia materia actuatur per formam et substantiatur et non suscipit formam nisi per potentiam.

Ad aliud dicendum, quod una est secundum essentiam. Ista tamen unitas non est extra rationem, sicut nec unitas generis.

Ad ultimum dicendum, quod materia cuiuslibet rei est in potentia ad quidlibet, nisi per accidens impediatur immediate, sicut ex igne fit aqua, et mediate, sicut acetum est in potentia ad vinum vel ex semine homo. Et dico per accidens, quia per accidens potest impedi, quia ex materia milii, non potest fieri leo, et hoc propter defectum quanti eo, quod materia, quae est in grano milii, non est sufficiens ad susceptionem | D 153rb | formae leonis. Si tamen sibi esset tantum de materia coniunctum, quantum sufficerent ad formam leonis, in materia tunc milii posset fieri forma leonis^{255xxxi}.

Liber VIII Metaphysicae (D, 153rb–vb; M, 107vb–108ra)

| D 153rb et M 107vb |

«Utrum materia proxima aliquid reale addat super materiam primam»

Nunc quaeritur, utrum materia proxima aliquid reale addat super materiam primam.

255 differentiam ... leonis *spatio relicto om.* M

Et videtur quod sic. Carnes et ossa sunt materia humana; sed carnes et ossa aliquid reale addunt super materiam primam^{xxxii}; ergo etc.

Praeterea quod est indifferens ad multa, non determinatur ad unum nisi per reale sibi additum; sed materia prima est huiusmodi^{xxxiii}; ergo etc.

Praeterea materia prima una est omnium et proxima alia et alia [ergo etc.], ut cholerae amara et phlegmatis dulce et amaritas et dulcitia realiter differunt; ergo etc.

Ad oppositum. Commune in speciali non est aliud ab eo realiter; sed materia communis non est extra materiam proximam; ergo realiter non differt ab ea²⁵⁶.

Ad illud dicendum est secundum quosdam²⁵⁷, quod materia proxima aliquid reale addit super materiam primam. Et hoc videtur sic²⁵⁸, quia forma non inducitur in quacumque materia, sed in materia disposita; sed materia non est disposita, nisi ut subiecta est²⁵⁹ passionibus realibus.

Praeterea corpus est²⁶⁰ materia animae^{xxxiv}, et corpus non solum²⁶¹ importat materiam primam, sed aliquid additum.

Sed ista non videntur concludere, quia, licet forma inducatur in materia disposita, dispositiones tamen non manent in inductione formae; dispositiones ergo²⁶² non pertinent ad rationem materiae²⁶³. Et²⁶⁴ similiter, licet²⁶⁵ anima sit actus corporis²⁶⁶, anima tamen immediate perficit²⁶⁷ materiam²⁶⁸, nec est forma corporis tamquam medium uniens animam cum materia²⁶⁹, licet anima non possit²⁷⁰ induci in materia nisi prius²⁷¹ inducta forma²⁷² corporis.

256 Nunc ... ea spatio relictio om. M

257 illud dicendum est, secundum quosdam: quaestionem dicunt quidam M

258 hoc videtur sic: huius ratio est M

259 est add. aliquibus M

260 est: e M

261 solum om. D

262 dispositiones ergo inv. M

263 rationem materiae: inductionem D

264 Et om. M

265 licet: si M

266 ipsa add. D

267 perficit: proficit ipsam M

268 materiam dub. add. quae est subiectum corporis M

269 materia: corpore D

270 possit: posset D

271 prius: primo D

272 forma illeg. D

Unde ad quaestionem dicendum est²⁷³, quod materia proxima nihil reale addit super materiam primam, alicui tamen reali coniungitur, cui non necessario coniungitur materia prima.

Declaratio²⁷⁴ primi est: Si materia proxima aliquid reale adderet²⁷⁵ super materiam primam, aut²⁷⁶ formam accidentalem aut substantialem. Si accidentalem, duo sequentur inconvenientia. Primum est, quod forma | M 108ra | accidentalis praecedet formam substantialem²⁷⁷ in materia. Secundum est, quod forma accidentalis participabit ad quiditatem speciei. Si autem addat²⁷⁸ formam substantialem | D 153va |, aut ergo illa forma est forma²⁷⁹ diminuta, quae postea fiat completa²⁸⁰ forma rei, et hoc improbatum est²⁸¹ in VII, aut erit forma substantialis perfecta et²⁸² completa, et tunc forma adveniens posterius²⁸³ erit accidens, quod videtur impossibile²⁸⁴.

Declaratio²⁸⁵ secundi est: Materia prima nullam formam sibi determinat substantialem nec accidentalem, immo²⁸⁶ cum materiam absolute apprehendimus, apprehendimus ipsam, ut prima est. Sed materia proxima diversorum coniuncta est cum diversis, quia materia²⁸⁷ cholerae est²⁸⁸ amara et materia²⁸⁹ phlegmatis dulcis²⁹⁰. Materia tamen remota utriusque potest esse idem. Ergo materia proxima alicuius speciei cum aliquo coniungitur, cui non ex necessitate coniungitur

273 ad quaestionem dicendum est: videtur esse dicendum ad quaestionem M

274 Declaratio: ostensio M

275 adderet: addet M

276 aut *add.* ergo M

277 formam substantialem: inductionem formae substantialis *M et Licht.* (cf. JOHANNES PICARDI VON LICHTENBERG 2025, 116, l. 24)

278 addat: addit *M et Licht.* (cf. JOHANNES PICARDI VON LICHTENBERG 2025, 116, l. 25)

279 forma *om.* M

280 completa *om.* D

281 improbatum est *inv.* M

282 et *om.* M

283 adveniens posterius *inv.* *M et Licht.* (cf. JOHANNES PICARDI VON LICHTENBERG 2025, 116, l. 27)

284 quod videtur impossibile *om.* D

285 Declaratio: ostensio M

286 immo: sed M

287 quia materia: materiae enim M

288 est: sunt M

289 materia: materiae M

290 dulcis: dulcia M

materia prima, inquantum²⁹¹ prima est, sicut patet in liquabilibus, quia²⁹² omnium liquabilium materia prima est aqua. Manifestum tamen est, quod alia²⁹³ est materia proxima secundum determinationem Philosophi in IV *Meteororum*^{xxxv}, ut²⁹⁴ auri et argenti et vini et olei.

Dicendum est igitur, quod materia proxima nihil reale addit super materiam primam, immo²⁹⁵ differunt secundum rationem solum²⁹⁶. Dicitur enim prima²⁹⁷, ut indifferens est ad omnem dispositionem^{xxxvi}, et dicitur proxima, ut est subiecta determinatae²⁹⁸ dispositioni, sicut materia dicitur naturalis, ut subiecta est qualitatibus sensibilibus, et dicitur mathematica, ut subiecta est dimensionibus^{xxxvii}, et dicitur prima, ut indifferens est ad haec et ad illa²⁹⁹. Et manifestum est, quod eadem realiter est materia, quae subicitur scilicet³⁰⁰ dimensionibus et qualitatibus sensibilibus, et tamen³⁰¹ de se³⁰² neutrum horum determinat³⁰³.

Ad primum argumentum³⁰⁴ dicendum, quod carnes et ossa³⁰⁵ non sunt proprie materia hominis, sed sunt partes eius integrales^{306xxxviii}, sed materia subiecta formae carnis et ossis³⁰⁷ est materia hominis, quia carnes et ossa non³⁰⁸ dicuntur, nisi ut sunt sub forma totius³⁰⁹, nec rationem aliter habent³¹⁰; et ideo carnes et ossa plus³¹¹ important quam materia.

291 inquantum *add.* materia *M*

292 quia *om.* *M*

293 alia: a *M*

294 ut *om.* *M*

295 immo: sed *M*

296 solum *om.* *M*

297 prima *add.* quia *D*

298 determinatae *om.* *D*

299 ad haec et ad illa: ad *sed exp. et add.* per privationem utriusque *M*

300 scilicet *om.* *M*

301 tamen: quae *M*

302 se *om.* *M*

303 determinat *add.* sibi *M*

304 primum argumentum: rationem primam *M*

305 ossa *add.* proprie *M*

306 materia hominis, sed sunt partes eius integrales: partes hominis, sed integrales *D*

307 formae carnis et ossis: hiis *D*

308 non *om.* *sed add. sup. lin.* *M*

309 totius *add.* ad *sed exp.* *M*

310 nec rationem aliter habent *om.* *M et Licht.* (cf. JOHANNES PICARDI VON LICHTENBERG 2025, 117, l. 39)

311 plus *dub.* *M*

Ad aliud dicendum, quod illud, quod de se est indifferens ad multa, si determinetur, hoc erit per alterum. Et ideo cum materia sit indifferens ad omnem formam |D 153vb|, determinatur ad formam³¹² et fit proxima per hoc, quod coniungitur determinatis passionibus, vel per considerationem³¹³ intellectus vel aliter³¹⁴ potest dici, quod materia non est indifferens ad omnem formam³¹⁵, nec indeterminata nisi apud intellectum, immo³¹⁶ omnis³¹⁷ materia, ut est³¹⁸ in re, determinata est. Et ideo solvatur prohibens – hoc est, auferatur³¹⁹ consideratio intellectus – et tunc³²⁰ quaelibet materia prima est proxima³²¹.

Ad aliud³²² dicendum, quod licet alia sit materia proxima cholerae et phlegmatis et eadem materia prima, non tamen materia proxima aliquid reale addit super materiam primam, quia non dicitur materia proxima, nisi quia coniuncta est aliquibus, quibus non coniungitur prima, inquantum prima est. Istud etiam³²³ patet in aliis³²⁴, quia³²⁵ singulare generatur et non universale, et universale definitur et non singulare; et tamen singulare nihil reale addit super universale nec in essentia nec in significato, et³²⁶ sic est in proposito. Licet materia proxima dicatur³²⁷ alia et prima una, non tamen proxima reale addit, quia prima non est realiter una et haec in diversis simul existentibus sicut nec proxima, nec proxima dicitur alia magis quam prima, nisi propter aliquid, quod est extra essentiam materiae primae³²⁸.

312 ad formam *exp. M*

313 considerationem: operationem *D*

314 aliter *om. D*

315 ad omnem formam *om. M*

316 immo: sed *M*

317 omnis *add. forma sed exp. DM*

318 est: existit *M*

319 auferatur *om. D*

320 tunc *om. M*

321 prima est proxima: est proxima prima *M*

322 aliud: secundum *M*

323 etiam *om. M*

324 aliis: multis *M*

325 quia *om. M*

326 et *om. M*

327 dicatur: sit *M*

328 materiae primae: primae materiae sicut amaritudo *M*

- i E.g. ARISTOTELES, AVERROES 1562-1574, vol. VIII, *In Metaphysicam*, VII, 28; VIII, 15; XII, 18, ff. 178vH, 224rA, 304vI.
- ii ARISTOTELES, AVERROES 1562-1574, vol. VIII, *In Metaphysicam*, XII, 18, f. 304rC.
- iii Cf. AVICENNA 1980, IX, 5, 489, l. 31–490, l. 35; 492, l. 91–493, l. 97; Cf. ARISTOTELES, AVERROES 1562-1574, vol. VIII, *In Metaphysicam*, XII, 18, f. 304rA–B.
- iv Cf. HAMESSE 1974, 170, l. 94; THOMAS DE AQUINO 1888–1906, I, 45, 2, arg. 4, 465b; THOMAS DE AQUINO 1973, 27, 3, arg. 9, 796, ll. 65–70.
- v *potius* ARISTOTELES, AVERROES 1562-1574, vol. X, *In Physicam*, III, 4, f. 87rB–E.
- vi Cf. ARISTOTLE 1936, I, 4, 187a26–187b4.
- vii ARISTOTELES 1957, 1033a31–1033b9.
- viii Cf. e.g. THOMAS DE AQUINO 1950, 350a; 352b–353a; THOMAS DE AQUINO 1888–1906, I, 45, 8, resp.; I–II, 63, 1, resp., 477a; 406a.
- ix *rectius* ARISTOTELES, AVERROES 1562-1574, vol. VIII, *In Metaphysicam*, XII, 18, ff. 304rD–304vL.
- x Cf. THOMAS DE AQUINO 1918–1926, II, 18, 305b.
- xi Cf. ARISTOTELES, AVERROES 1562-1574, vol. VIII, *In Metaphysicam*, VII, 28; XII, 18, ff. 178rB–C, 304vI.
- xii ARISTOTELES, AVERROES 1562-1574, vol. VIII, *In Metaphysicam*, VII, 28; XII, 18, ff. 178vH, 304rA–B.
- xiii Cf. ARISTOTELES, AVERROES 1562-1574, vol. VIII, *In Metaphysicam*, XII, 18, f. 304rC.
- xiv ARISTOTELES 1957, 994a1–994b31.
- xv Cf. ARISTOTELES 1957, 1039a7; 1041b8; HAMESSE 1974, 130, ll. 12–14; THOMAS DE AQUINO 1950, 381a; 397b.
- xvi Cf. ARISTOTELES 1957, 1029a20–26; ARISTOTELES 1957, 989a31–989b21; HAMESSE 1974, 128, ll. 77–78; 117, ll. 34–39; THOMAS DE AQUINO 1950, 58a–b.
- xvii ARISTOTELES 1831–1870, *De generatione et corruptione*, I, 5, 320b12–14.
- xviii Cf. ARISTOTELES 1957, 1039a7; 1041b8; HAMESSE 1974, 130, ll. 12–14; THOMAS DE AQUINO 1950, 381a; 397b.
- xix Cf. ARISTOTELES 1957, 1016b31–32; HAMESSE 1974, 125, ll. 8–9; THOMAS DE AQUINO 1992, *De trinitate*, 4, 2, arg. 1; ad arg. 1, 122, ll. 1–8; 125, ll. 247–252.
- xx Cf. ARISTOTELES, AVERROES 1562-1574, vol. IX, *De substantia orbis*, 1, f. 3vM.
- xxi Cf. e.g. PETRUS DE TARANTASIA 1649–1652, II, 3, 1, 3, 1, resp., 31a.
- xxii ARISTOTELES 1957, 1058a23; THOMAS DE AQUINO 1950, 500b.
- xxiii Cf. ARISTOTELES, AVERROES 1562-1574, vol. VIII, *In Metaphysicam*, XII, 14, ff. 300vL–301rB.
- xxiv Cf. e.g. PETRUS DE TARANTASIA 1649–1652, II, 3, 1, 3, 2, resp., f. 32a.
- xxv Cf. e.g. PETRUS DE TARANTASIA 1649–1652, II, 3, 1, 3, 2, resp., f. 32a.
- xxvi ARISTOTELES 1831–1870, *De generatione et corruptione*, I, 1, 314b29–315a2; HAMESSE 1974, 167, ll. 36–37.

- xxvii Cf. THOMAS DE AQUINO 1976, *De principiis naturae*, 42, ll. 47–52.
- xxviii Cf. ARISTOTELES 1957, 1029a20–26; ARISTOTELES 1957, 989a31–989b21; HAMESSE 1974, 128, ll. 77–78; 117, ll. 34–39; THOMAS DE AQUINO 1950, 58a–b.
- xxix ARISTOTELES 1831–1870, *De generatione et corruptione*, I, 5, 320b12–14.
- xxx Cf. ARISTOTELES 1957, 1016b31–32; HAMESSE 1974, 125, ll. 8–9; THOMAS DE AQUINO 1992, *De trinitate*, 4, 2, arg. 1; ad arg. 1, 122, ll. 1–8; 125, ll. 247–252.
- xxxi Cf. AEGIDIUS ROMANUS 1567, f. 7rb–va.
- xxxii Cf. THOMAS DE AQUINO 1950, 359a; THOMAS DE AQUINO 1918–1926, II, 92, 558b; THOMAS DE AQUINO 1888–1906, III, 5, 2, resp., 88b.
- xxxiii Cf. THOMAS DE AQUINO 1918–1926, I, 43, 1, 1, resp., 1003.
- xxxiv Cf. THOMAS DE AQUINO 1976, *De principiis naturae*, 43, ll. 14–15.
- xxxv Cf. ARISTOTELES 1831–1870, *Meteorologica*, IV, 10, 388a10–389a25.
- xxxvi Cf. THOMAS DE AQUINO 1929, 43, 1, 1, resp., 1003; ARISTOTELES 1957, 989a31–989b21; 1029a20–26; HAMESSE 1974, 128, ll. 77–78; 117, ll. 34–39.
- xxxvii Cf. e.g. THOMAS DE AQUINO 1888–1906, I, 85, 1, ad arg. 2, 331b.
- xxxviii Cf. THOMAS DE AQUINO 1965, 92b; 135b; THOMAS DE AQUINO 1888–1906, I, 85, 1, ad arg. 2, 331b.

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